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MODES OF REPRESENTATION, THE EPISTEMIC SUBJECT 
And DEVELOPMENTAL WORD ASSOCIATION PHENOMENA
by
Ellen M. Gerschitz 
Advisor: Professor Marilyn Shatz
This study was devised to investigate the developmental syntagmatic- 
paradigmatic word association shift. In syntagmatic associations the 
stimulus and associative response are of different grammatical form classes 
and appear to be grammatically continuous, as response may follow stimulus 
in an utterance (e.g. cat-meov^)* These are the predominant responses of 
children before the ages of six to eight. Older children and adults shift 
to making paradigmatic associations in which stimulus and response are 
from the same form class and may be substituted for one another in an 
utterance (e.g. cat-dog). This shift was explained in terms of underlying 
symbolic mediational processes and the epistemic subject, the child’s 
interpretation of the unstated task demands of the word association test.
The central hypotheses were:
1. The syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift occurs because younger 
children use verbally-evoked images to generate their word associations 
and so produce syntagmatic responses. Older children, on the other hand, 
rely less on verbally-evoked images and more on knowledge of unstated 
task demands to generate their word associations. Older children can 
accomplish this because they have acquired explicit or potentially articu­
lated knowledge of hierarchic semantic organization (abbreviated HSO) of
V
words (e.g. cats and dogs are animals), which younger children have only 
tacit, unarticulated knowledge of. On the basis of other studies (e.g. 
Mansfield, 1977; Steinberg & Anderson, 1975) it was assumed that all age 
groups have comparable implicit knowledge of hierarchic semantic 
organization and that therefore this would not play a significant role in 
the shift to paradigmatic responding.
2. The ability to change deliberately the mode of representation 
(i.e. imaginal or linguistic) through which word association responses 
are mediated depends on the acquisition of two kinds of metaknowledge: 
a) metalinguistic knowledge and b) explicit knowledge of imagery.
To test these hypotheses, twenty kindergarteners, twenty second 
graders and ten college students were presented with 48 words, consist­
ing of high and low imagery nouns, verbs and adjectives under five dif­
ferent word association instruction conditions: 1) the standard "first-
word"; 2) paradigmatic, in which Ss were trained to give an association 
which could substitute for the stimulus in a sentence; 3) syntagmatic 
in which Ss were trained to give an association which together with the 
stimulus would complete a phrase; 4) imagery, in which the subject was 
asked to obtain a "picture" of the stimulus word in her head before 
responding and 5) time delay, which required that the subject wait three 
seconds before responding. The purpose of this last condition was to 
determine whether the delay in responding was responsible for a possible 
increased frequency of syntagmatic associations in the imagery condition. 
One half the kindergarteners and second graders also received: 1) two
convergent measures of metalinguistic knowledge, which tap the child's 
understanding
VI
of words as arbitrary, interchangeable units; 2) two convergent measures 
of explicit knowledge of imagery, which tap the child's understanding of 
the distinction between (a) images and words and (b) images and objects; 
3) the hierarchic semantic organization and 4) word-word relationship 
tasks. The latter two tasks respectively tap the child's tacit and 
explicit understanding of the hierarchic semantic organization of words.
A control group consisted of the remaining ten kindergarten and 
second grade children who received only the five word association tests. 
The purpose of this control group was to determine if administration of 
the metalinguistic and other cognitive tasks influenced subsequent word 
association responding.
The results showed that there appear#to be a developmental 
progression in the way children approach the word association task.
First, very young children seem to produce responses based only on the 
phonological form of the word; i.e., they produce clang responses, which 
rhyme with the stimulus, or negated responses, generated through an 
” negation " rule which consists of prefixing "not" or "un" to the 
phonological form of the stimulus word to produce a response. Later, 
children begin to consider the meaning of the stimulus word. At the 
start, this may be confined to considering the imagery which the stimulus 
word evokes. Evidence indicates that stimulus imagery mediates the 
generation of syntagmatic associations. Gradually, as tacitly known 
hierarchic semantic organization becomes more filled-in,* and the child 
gains explicit access to it, it is possible for her to produce paradig­
matic responses. But in order to do so spontaneously, she must also 
understand that words are arbitrary, manipulable units. On the other 
* As determined by absolute number of correct responses.
VII
hand, if she is explicitly directed to produce paradigmatic responses, 
she will be able to do so, as long as she has explicit access to a 
filled-in hierarchic semantic structure. Metalinguistic knowledge does 
not play a role in this case since the explicit directions replace its 
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MODES OF REPRESENTATION, THE EPISTEMIC SUBJECT AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL WORD ASSOCIATION PHENOMENA
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The free word association test is used to tap various cognitive and 
affective phenomena within theoretical frameworks as diverse as 
behaviorism and psychoanalysis. The test merely requires the subject to 
"say the first word that comes to mind" in response to a verbal stimulus. 
In testing children, researchers note qualitative changes with age in 
response commonality and the conceptual and grammatical relationships 
which obtain between stimuli and their corresponding responses (Cramer, 
1968). This paper is mainly concerned with the changes in the grammatical 
relationships, often referred to as the syntagmatic-paradigmatic word 
association shift (Brown & Berko, 1960; Ervin, 1961; Entwisle, 1966, 1970; 
McNeill, 1966, 1970).
In syntagmatic associations the stimulus and associative response 
are of different grammatical form classes and appear to be grammatically 
continuous, as response may follow stimulus in an utterance (e.g., dog- 
bark). These are the predominant responses of children before the age 
of six to eight. Older children and adults shift to making paradigmatic 
associations in which stimulus and response are from the same form class 
and may be substituted for one another in an utterance (e.g., dog-cat). 
There are two major conceptual classifications of paradigmatic 
associations: a) logical and b) functional. In logical paradigmatic 
associations, the stimulus and response word are related to one another
2
through some categorization or class inclusion relationship. For example, 
the stimulus word may be a category name and the response an example of 
that category (e.g., anlmal-dog). In functional paradigmatic associations, 
the stimulus and response word denote entitles between which there is an 
explicit functional relationship (e.g., car-gas).
The characterization of the developmental shift as syntagmatic- 
paradlgmatic is often gross and even misleading, however, since its 
manifestation varies with grammatical class (e.g., Entwistle, 1966; Sharp 
& Cole, 1972). For example, very young children produce a preponderance 
of nouns to all grammatical classes of stimuli, with the result that the 
shift is more pronounced for adjectives, verbs and adverbs than for 
nouns.* Even adults produce paradigmatic responses to nouns, adjectives 
and verbs in that order. In addition, certain syntagmatic associations 
(e.g., verb-adverb; adjectlve-noun) actually increase with age, while 
miscellaneous responding (e.g., multiword and rhyming responses) decreases. 
This will be discussed in greater detail later. Further, sentence 
substitution and completion criteria for determining whether an association 
is paradigmatic and syntagmatic respectively are often not adhered to and 
similarity of form class ia the only rule used to classify responses even 
though the response labels do not so indicate.
Despite the descriptive shortcomings of the syntagmatic-paradigmatic 
dichotomy, a rather large body of literature discusses developmental word
* Young children do not only produce nouns as associative responses, 
but other form classes as well. For example, four year olds produce 
adverb-vseb pairs 41.3Z of the time and adverb-neun pairs only 26.9Z of 
the time. In addition, noun responses are made with varying frequencies 
to various form class stimuli, Indicating that even very young children 
are sensitive to form class. Further, even four year olds produce para­
digmatic responses with appreciable frequency (e.g., verb-verb pairs - 
18.8Z; adjective-adjective —  17.5Z) (Entwistle, 1966).
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association behavior in these terms as it constitutes a concise, concep­
tually useful terminology which is largely descriptively valid. Hence, 
the terminology will be retained here.
The shift has been interpreted as having significance for a variety 
of psychological phenomena such as a) associative learning; b) linguistic- 
syntactic organization; c) semantic-organlzatlon; d) cognitive, conceptual 
or logical operational organization. All of these widely divergent 
interpretations, however, share one assumption; that word associations 
are made without the subject's consideration of the task demands and 
culturally learned values. Further, none of them approaches the problem 
in terms of the symbolic mediational process which may be said to represent 
the production of word associations.
The position taken here is different from these in two ways. First, 
it views word association responses as a reflection of the child's 
perception of the task demands and culturally learned values as follows:
The word association task is an open-ended unstructured one. Because of 
its openendedness, it is meaningless to a young child. To attempt to 
make sense of and comply with the experimenter's demand to say a word in 
response to a stimulus the child at first responds with clang (rhyming 
responses; e.g., fruit-moot) or multiword (e.g., fruit-I eat fruit) 
associations. She also makes other responses such as syntagmatic ones, 
but it is only with exposure to formal education and the modes of respond­
ing it prefers that the child comes to produce a preponderance of 
paradigmatic associations based on mechanisms to be discussed shortly.
Second, the present position differs from others in that it analyzes 
the problem in terms of underlying symbolic mediational processes. I
4
postulate that there are two major representational systems, linguistic 
and imaglnal, which provide the symbolic mediators to generate word 
association responses. Further, there are two types of linguistic medi­
ators: a) hierarchic semantic organization and b) syntactic.
Hierarchic semantic organization, one form of linguistic representa­
tion, refers to the structure (as opposed to the content) of class 
inclusion relationships among words (e.g., anlmal-cat-dog). At first the 
child has only implicit^ access to hierarchic semantic organization and 
it is tapped only by tasks which do not require the child to apply it deliber­
ately to task situations (e.g., Nelson, 1974; Steinberg & Anderson,
1975; Mansfield, 1977). Gradually, with exposure to abstract
categorization systems, the knowledge becomes more and more explicit and 
may be used in tasks which call for its increasingly deliberate application.
Linguistic syntactic mediators refer to linguistic structures which 
generate syntactic sequences. Substantial evidence indicates that syntag­
matic responses are produced by imaginal symbolic mediators. But they may
2 Implicit knowledge of a phenomenon cannot be articulated, in contrast 
to explicit knowledge which has at least the potential to be articulated. 
Certain cases of release from proactive inhibition demonstrate this 
distinction quite clearly. Proactive inhibition refers to the decline in 
performance on successive short term memory tests which involve stimuli 
from the same category. For example, if three sets of three numbers are 
presented, recall of the third set will be much lower than that for the 
first set. If a set of three letters is presented on the fourth trial, 
however, performance on that set will be equivalent to that on the first 
set of numbers. This demonstrates release from proactive inhibition.
Such release also occurs if old and new sets are respectively drawn from 
the opposite poles of the potency, evaluation and activity dimensions of 
the semantic differential. Direct examination and comparison of these two 
different sets of words does not permit them to be grouped into two 
separate categories, however. The knowledge which distinguishes them and 
allows release from proactive inhibition to occur is tacitly or implicitly, 
rather than explicitly held (Turvey, 1974).
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also be produced by linguistic syntactic mediators. Paradigmatic
associations, on the other hand, are assumed to be produced only by 
hierarchic semantic mediators.
Developmental changes in the differential use of the imaglnal and 
linguistic representational systems hypothesized to partially account 
for the syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift. At first, the child bases her 
word association responses mainly on the properties of her stimulus-evoked 
images. Consequently, the young child produces a preponderance of 
syntagmatic responses. Gradually, through education and practice in overt 
abstract categorization, class inclusion relationships between words or 
"hierarchic semantic organization" become available for application to the 
word association task. The child exploits that structure to produce 
responses, for in addition to providing her with explicit access to it, 
her education has also taught her that such responses are highly valued.
Hence it is hypothesized that as the child acquires explicit access 
to hierarchic semantic organization, as manifested by her articulated 
knowledge of class inclusion relationships among words, she produces 
logical paradigmatic responses. But this does not imply that the reasons 
for her preference for making paradigmatic responses can be articulated.
It also does not imply that she is able to voluntarily switch her mode of 
repponding from one type of linguistic representational basis to another 
(i.e., from hierarchic semantic to syntactic) or from a linguistic basis 
to an lmaginal one. It is hypothesized that two types of metaknowledge 
are required to do so: knowledge of a) words and b) images as entitles
distinct from one another and from the objects they represent. Once this 
knowledge is acquired, the child is able to control flexibly the type
6
of symbolic mediator she uses to generate her word association responses 
so that they consist of either a) the properties of stimulus evoked images 
or b) linguistic mediators (e.g., hierarchic semantic organization or 
syntactic factors). Until this occurs, the child only automatically rather 
than consciously and deliberately, accesses this hierarchic organization 
to produce logical paradigmatic associations.
Note on Associative Structure
It has often been assumed that overt verbal associations reflect 
semantic or cognitive organization in memory. Associationist theory, the 
simplest and oldest one attempting to account for the relationship 
between overt association and inner mental organization, holds that 
contiguity is not only descriptive of the associative sequence, but that 
it also is its cause. More recently, various structural principles have 
been introduced to provide a rather more complicated and at the same time, 
simpler mechanism to explain the occurrence of an infinite number of 
possible association sequences. These structural principles, which are 
meant to describe semantic memory specifically* are not necessarily iso­
morphic with linguistic or logical structures.3 Clark (in Nelson, 1977), 
for example, uses the notion of conceptual or semantic features or 
"atoms of meaning" which are gradually arranged in a hierarchy as develop­
ment proceeds. Still others use the notion of propositlonal or functional 
relationships Instead of hierarchically arranged semantic features or 
sentence structure mechanisms to represent semantic memory (Nelson, 1977).
I have assumed that semantic memory may at least be partially 
isomorphic with logical structure and that memory is organized in
3 Logical structure refers to the hierarchy of class inclusion 
relationships among words (e.g., animals include mammals, reptiles, 
amphibians, etc.; mammals include dogs, cats, humans, and so on).
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essentially the same logical structure in both young children and adults. 
The difference between these groups, however, is in the ability to exploit 
that latent structure and use it to generate responses in tasks that call 
for a more explicitly produced solution. Of course, it is also assumed 
that word association is such a task.
In the following chapter the normative evidence and the data pertain­
ing to previously proposed explanations of the syntagmatic-paradlgmatlc 
shift are examined. This will permit us to more fully explore the one put 
forth here.
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CHAPTER II - REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A. Normative Studies
1. Developmental Data
The first major word association study with children was performed 
in 1916 by Woodrow and Lowell. They tested 1,000 nine to twelve year olds 
with 100 words, 90 of which had been used by Kent and Rosanoff (1910) in 
an earlier study of 1,000 "men-in-industry." Children were found to dif­
fer from adults in both the frequency and content of their associations. 
Children gave fewer contrast, superordinate, coordinate, part-whole, 
noun-abstract attribute, participle and cause-effect (e.g., fire-hot) 
responses. Children also gave more verbs, verb-object, noun-adjective, 
adjective-noun, pronoun, sound similarity, contiguity and whole-part 
responses. As Woodworth & Schlosberg (1954) noted,
"Children tend to stay by the thing mentioned; they 
tell something about the thing, complete or enlarge 
upon the idea conveyed by the stimulus word; whereas 
adults jump to a related, parallel idea."4
Palermo & Jenkins (1963) using a word list identical to that of 
Woodrow & Lowell, found that compared to Woodrow & Lowell's norms paradig­
matic responding of nine to thirteen year olds had increased by ten 
percentage points or more for both nouns and adjectives. This was 
especially true of superordinate responses. Hence, since 1916, children 
had become more "adultlike" in their responses. The authors attributed
4 R. S. Woodworth and H. Schlosberg, Experimental psychology (rev. 
ed.). New York: Holt, Rfakahart & Winston, 1954, p. 54.
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this chronological-cultural change to the homogenizing influence of the 
mass media and urbanization.
Numerous studies have shown that the shift manifests itself to 
different degrees depending on the form class of the stimulus. It is 
generally most apparent for adjective and verb stimuli and least for noun 
stimuli. For example, Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert & Phillips (1964) found 
that first through fourth graders produced paradigmatic responses to 
nouns, adjectives and verbs in that order. Palermo (1972) presented a 
100 item list i.o 100 children in first to fourth grade and found that there 
is little change in paradigmatic responding to nouns, but significant 
shifts to adjective, adverb, verb, pronoun and prepositions, with the 
greatest shift occurring between first and second grade. Superordinate 
and contrast responding also Increased over this time. Palermo (1963) 
also noted that paradigmatic responses to adjectives increased earlier 
than other grammatical classes. All grammatical classes elicited more 
paradigmatic responses from twelfth grade subjects than from fourth grade, 
except adjectives which elicited as many paradigmatic responses from both 
groups. Indeed, Palermo (1965) found that paradigmatic responding to 
adjectives peaked at grade two and remained constant thereafter.
Entwisle, Forsyth & Muuss (1964) tested 500 four to ten year olds 
and found that there was little increase in paradigmatic noun responses 
throughout childhood. Paradigmatic responses to adjectives however, 
underwent an accelerating Increase between kindergarten and third grade 
and a further slight increase from third to fifth grade, amounting to a 
total increase of 500Z. Changes in responses for verbs proceeded at a 
slower pace than for other form classes, but paradigmatic responding was
10
strongly established by the fl£th grade.
Entwisle et. al. attribute these results to the young child's 
"primitive noun response," the tendency to respond with nouns to all types 
of stimuli regardless of form class. They summarized their findings as 
follows: Four to five year olds make many multiple word and clang
(rhyming) responses in addition to a preponderance of noun as opposed to 
other form class responses. With five to six year olds, there is a 
decrease in noun responding, and paradigmatic responding to adjectives and 
verbs is observed. Syntagmatic responding is evident. In six to eight 
year olds, noun and syntagmatic responses drop sharply, while paradigmatic 
responses increase markedly. From eight to ten, paradigmatic verb 
responses increase and the percentage of syntagmatic responses declines 
to the adult level.
In a subsequent study, Entwisle (1966) varied the frequency as well 
as the form class of the stimuli. The findings of the earlier study were 
basically reiterated with some additional observations. First, frequency 
accounted for only a relatively small percentage of the variance in 
paradigmatic responding. Seoond, contrast verbs (e.g., add-subtract; buy- 
sell) and adjectives (e.g. black-white) show a sudden shift toward para­
digmatic responding between first and third grade. Non-contrast adjectives 
and verbs on the other hand, (e.g., yellow, thirsty) show a gradual 
pattern of increase in paradigmatic responding. Third, although syntactic 
responding is generally at its peak at kindergarten or first grade, it 
still exists and even increases in some cases to college.
Entwisle claims that adult syntactics are enlargements in meaning and 
a richer Interpretation of the concept, while children's syntactics are
11
based merely on grammatical contiguity. It is interesting to recall at 
this point that Woodworth & Schlosberg (1954) claimed that children's 
rather than adults' syntactic responses represented an enlargement of the 
stimulus idea. These contradictory Interpretations of the same 
phenomenon highlight the difficulty of deciphering the developmental 
significance of various stimulus-response relationships, a point which will 
be elaborated upon in the discussion of cognitive frameworks.
In sum, the normative data for children shows that the frequency of 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic responding is determined at least by form 
class, frequency, and the particular characteristics of the words sampled 
(e.g., contrast vs. noncontrast). The shift is observed more dramatically 
for high frequency adjectives, while nouns tend to be paradigmatic at all 
ages and verbs tend to be more strongly syntagmatic.
2. Adult Data
Several investigators have examined the syntagmatic-paradigmatic 
phenomenon exclusively with adults. Fillenbaum and Jones (1965) tested 
adult undergraduates and summarized the results to other studies. They 
found high variation in paradigmatic responding among the various form 
classes, ranging from 79Z for nouns to 23Z and 29Z for articles and 
conjunctions respectively. Deese (1962) found a surprisingly low level 
of paradigmatic responding for all classes but nouns for 100 adults.
Deese also found that in adults, syntagmatic responses were correlated 
with Thorndike-Lorge word frequency only for adjectives. The high frequency 
adjectives generated contrast paradigmatic responses. Verbs, adverbs and 
low frequency adjectives generated about as many paradigmatic as syntag­
matic responses. Syntagmatic responses were more often elicited by adverbs 
followed by adjectives and verbs and then by nouns. In some contrast
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however, Glanzer (1962) found that the responses of army enlisted men 
tended to be of the same grammatical category as the stimuli.
Thus, the adult and childood data are consistent in that nouns elicit 
more paradigmatic responses than adjectives and verbs. But for adults 
verbs seem to elicit more paradigmatic responses than adjectives, while 
for children the reverse is true.
3. Conceptual Stimulus-Response Relationships
Several studies have analyzed the stimulus-response relationship in 
conceptual (e.g., contrast : black-white; superordinate : black-color) 
rather than in grammatical terms. For example, Palermo (1971) found that 
superordinate and contrast responding Increased over grades one to four. 
Palermo & Jenkins (1963) compared their data to that of Kent & Rosanoff 
(1910) and Woodrow & Lowell (1916). They found that while frequency of 
superordinate responding had decreased for adults from 1910-1961, it 
remained the same for fourth and fifth graders with children now giving 
more superordinate responses than adults. Palermo & Jenkins (1965), 
however, determined that the increase was partly only an apparent one and 
was partly a function of the different methods of stimulus administration, 
with oral rather than written stimuli producing more paradigmatic responses 
for nouns. But only time made a difference for adjective stimuli with 
1961 and 1963 testing yielding more paradigmatic responses than the 
Woodrow & Lowell (1916) administration. Contrast responding also appeared 
to have clearly Increased in 1961 compared to 1916 children.
Koff (1965) found that both adults of 1954 and children of 1963 
had a heightened level of contrast responding compared respectively to 
adults of 1910 and children of 1916. In sum, it seems that cultural 
changes occurring between the 1910's and the 1950's and 1960's have
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generally resulted In an increasing sophistication of word association 
responding in both children and adults. This may be attributed to the 
homogenizing effect of mass media and urbanization and perhaps also to 
different task interpretations and practice in test taking by the different 
populations.
To sum up these findings, in both children and adults nouns elicit 
more paradigmatic responses than any other form class, with adjectives 
and verbs following in that or the reverse order. Contrast and super­
ordinate responding increases throughout childhood, while superordinate 
responding declines thereafter. Various hypotheses have been offered to 
explain these findings and these will now be examined.
B. The Interpretative Frameworks 
1. The A8soclationist Framework
The associationist framework has historically been most widely used 
to Interpret word association data (e.g., Galton, 1879; Cattell, 1887).
Most recently, Ervin (1961) applied associationist principles in an 
attempt to explain the syntagmatlc-paradigmatic word association shift.
She claims that associationa are learned as the listener anticipates the 
words not yet spoken as she processes the flow of speech. Words which can 
be substituted for one another, paradigmatically related words, come to 
be associated as the listener makes incorrect guesses about the word to 
come. Syntagmatically related words are more easily and obviously 
associated through their actual contiguity. Hence, recall mechanisms 
(i.e.i recall of associated words) are assumed to underlie the production 
of both syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations.
Support for this hypothesis came from a correlation of .87 between 
the transitional probabilities of five grammatical classes in actual
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syntagmatic word associations and those of the same five classes in texts. 
Further, first, second, third and sixth graders exhibited earlier Increases 
in paradigmatic responses for words which frequently appear in the final 
as opposed to medial position in a sentence, as predicted from the theory. 
Final words present a more efficient means of establishing substitutive 
as opposed to grammatically contiguous associations, since no word follows 
the final word and, therefore, no word is grammatically contiguous with it. 
Only substitutive associations can be learned for final words, as the 
subject makes erroneous anticipations.
In a subsequent study, Ervin (1963) administered a free word 
association test to high school and college students and then asked them 
to use each stimulus word in a sentence. Subsequently they were to provide 
four words which could be substituted for the original stimuli in their 
sentences. For most stimuli the greatest predictor of associative response 
frequency was the response's rate of substitution in the sentences. 
Similarly, syntagmatic associative frequency was predicted by contextual 
frequency if the response followed rather than preceded the stimulus in 
the sentence, as is predicted from the theory.
To further test Ervin's (1961) hypothesis McNeill (1963) constructed 
sentence frames such that nonsen ge syllables occurred only if the two 
nonsence syllables had been learned in the same context. If they occupied 
the same grammatical position in a different sentence their occurrence as 
paradigmatic responses did not increase with learning. This was interpreted 
as strong empirical support for the Ervin hypothesis, since it predicts 
that paradigmatic responses occur only after two words sharing the same 
context are erroneously anticipated for one another, thus becoming 
associated. As McNeill noted, however, these results can just as easily
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be explained by a standard mediated association theorem; i.e., any two 
words that share associates become associated. In this case the two noun 
nonsense syllables shared the adjective nonsense syllable, becoming 
associated through its mediational effect.
Indeed, in a later study, McNeill (1966) presented evidence which 
refuted Ervin's position. Since Ervin's hypothesis assumes that word 
associations are produced through recall, more training of overt erroneous 
anticipations should result in a greater number of paradigmatic responses, 
as these pairs should more efficiently recall or elicit one another. This 
was not the case, however. Further, subjects who had training in construct­
ing sentences using nonsense syllables and replacing them with other 
"grammatically correct" nonsense syllables made significantly more 
paradigmatic responses than Ss who just received erroneous anticipation 
training. This indicated that sentence production mechanisms themselves 
play an important generative role in word association rather than the 
reverse associationist claim that associative mechanisms play an important 
role in sentence production*
In a study with adults, Glucksberg & Cohen (1965) used nonsense 
syllable trigrams in noun and verb positions in sentences which were 
purportedly constructed to preclude specific referential meanings. They 
were then used as stimuli in a free word association test. Paradigmatic 
word associations were obtained as a function of the nonsense syllable's 
syntactic usage and approximated the levels found with regular words in 
other studies. These results cannot be attributed to the stimulus having 
frequently occurred in the context of identical other stimuli as Ervin 
claims is necessary. Instead the authors concluded that paradigmatic
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responses in adults are the result of a substitution process based solely 
on grammatical category, as this was the only cue they claim their subjects 
had to the significance of the nonsense syllable stimuli.
Thos, both McNeill (1066) and Glusksberg and Cohen (1965) did not 
provide experimental support for Ervin's hypothesis. But even if such 
studies using adult propulations and nonsense syllables had been supportive, 
it is questlonnable whether such findings could be generalized to 
developmental phenomena in children who are tested with actual words. In 
addition, it is unlikely that children could acquire the vast amount of 
experience required for developing the appropriate associations which would 
be necessary to accomplish the paradigmatic shift. There is also no 
evidence that either children or adults process the flow of speech in an 
anticipatory manner (McNeill, 1966). Hence, it appears that a simple 
associative account does not constitute an adequate explanation of the 
syntagmatic-paradigmatlc word association shift.
2. The Linguistic Syntactic Framework
The linguistic-syntactic approach to developmental word association 
behavior was primarily adopted by Brown & Berko (1960). It is derived 
from Chomsky's (1965) generative transformational grammar and makes 
certain developmental psycholinguistic assumptions; namely that the child 
learns language through an unspecified inductive process whereby the 
function of various parts of speech become known through direct contact 
with the language's sentences and the words which compose them. Onee 
the child "appreciates" syntactic similarity of various words belonging 
to different parts of speech, she is able to form meaningful and grammatical 
sentences. As this appreciation of syntactic similarity of words develops, 
it becomes an increasingly important determinant of word association. The
17
syntagmatic-paradigmatlc shift (which, rather significantly, Brown & Berko 
call the heterogeneous-homogeneous shift) is therefore one manifestation 
of the acquisition of syntax. Hence, within this framework both word 
associations and sentences are produced by the same mechanism; i.e., 
"appreciation" of syntactic similarity.
To test their hypothesis, Brown and Berko presented first, second 
and third graders and adults with a word association test consisting of 
36 items from six grammatical categories; count and mass nouns, adjectives, 
transitive and intransitive verbs and adverbs, and a grammar usage test 
which required subjects to make up new sentences using nonsense syllables 
which functioned as the same six parts of speech as used in the word 
association test. These syllables were introduced to the S by the E who 
appropriately used each one in two sentences.
A heterogeneity/homogeneity dichotomy rather than the syntagmatic- 
paradigmatlc one was used to classify word associations. The discrepancy 
between heterogeneity and syntagmatic categories of the two respective 
scoring systems constitutes the main difference between them. While a 
syntagmatic response is always heterogeneous, a heterogeneous response is 
not always a syntagmatic one, as for example in the pair "difficulty-hard." 
While these two words are of different grammatical classes they do not 
follow one another in a sentence.
Performance on the grammatical usage test was highly correlated with 
that on the word association test by word class; the order of accurate 
performance on the former and the proportion of homogeneous responses on 
the latter was similar, except that the order for nouns and verbs was 
reversed. On this basis the authors conclude that the syntagmatic- 
paradigmatlc shift is a consequence of the child's gradual organization
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of her vocabulary Into syntactic classes.
As McNeill (1966) points out, however, children fomm correct grammatical 
sentences and obviously are well acquainted at least implicitly with English 
syntax long before the shift occurs. Hence Brown and Berko's position can 
justifiably be rejected outright. Yet a closer more critical look at thair 
grammar usage test reveals some useful information nonetheless. In this 
task the child becomes acquainted with the nonsense syllable test item in 
just two contrived sentence presentations. This can be assumed to be too 
few and too removed from supporting ongoing context for the child to 
arrive at an Implicit understanding of its grammatlcality as quickly as 
the task demands her to. Yet she nevertheless possesses these intuitions
with respect to other words in her vocabulary. It seems likely that this
discrepancy in performance can be attributed to the child's inability to 
use various rather subtle surface structure elements like word endings which 
must be isolated from the rest af the word, as quick and efficient cues to
play the experimenter's game. It would appear then that Brown and Berko's
grammar usage test explores the child's explicit and potentially articulated 
(as opposed to implicit and unarticulated) knowledge of syntax. Since the 
task requires that not only words, but also parts of words, such as word 
endings are understood as lsolable units, explicit knowledge of words as 
words, or metalinguistic knowledge, would seem to be a prerequisite for 
adequate performance.
3. Semantic Organization Framework
There are several accounts of word association in terms of semantic 
organization. For example, McNeill (1966) specifically proposed an 
alternative to the Ervin (1961) and Brown & Berko (1960) hypotheses to
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explain Che syntagmatic-paradigmatlc word association shift. Like Brown & 
Berko he used transformational generative grammar as a starting point, but 
emphasized its semantic rather than syntactic aspects, taking an 
interpretive semantic position and adopting the selectional restrictive 
and semantic feature system derived from Chomsky (1965) and Katz & Fodor 
(1963). In this system, lexical items are specified by features which 
determine their syntactic status and meaning. In addition, McNeill made 
two assumptions: a) that verbal associates are produced generatively
and b) that the response chosen as the associate is one whose features 
contrast minimally with those of the stimulus. For those with complete 
semantic systems, this word is of the same form class as the stimulus.
But for young children, this word is often not of the same form class, 
since their lexicons are not characterized by as many features as adults' 
and their semantic categories extend across grammatical categories. Thus, 
McNeill claims that paradigmatic responding occurs at all ages and that 
syntagmatic responding is merely an artifact of the young child's incomplete 
semantic system.
Clifton (1967) elaborated upon McNeill's position by more clearly 
distinguishing between aspects of the feature system which contribute to 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations respectively. A syntagmatic 
association occurs when the contextual, selectional-restrictive features 
(e.g., one selection restriction for "good" is [fval: ( ■— ) of a lex­
ical item are matched to the (semantic and syntactic) inherent features 
of another. A paradigmatic association occurs when features of one lexical 
item are more generally matched with those of other lexical items.
Clark (1970), on the other hand, suggests that in children and adults 
different types of associates are generated by different rules which
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operate according to a general principle of simplicity of production and 
least change of the stimulus' syntactic and semantic features, which Clark 
does, but McNeill does not order in a hierarchy. Since young children's 
lexicons lack semantic features lower down on the hierarchy, tihey can 
apply fewer rules to generate associations than older children and adults. 
For example, paradigmatic responses may be generated by rules such as the 
minimal contrast rule (which is McNeill's only one) in which the response 
is a word whose features contrast minimally with those of the stimulus. 
There is also a marking rule, in which a marked word elicits its unmarked^ 
opposite; a feature deletion or addition rule, which generates subordinate 
or superordinate responses respectively, and category preservation rule 
which generates coordinate responses. Syntagmatic associations are 
generated by a selectional feature realization rule, similar to Clifton's 
and an idiom completion rule (e.g., table-cloth).
This formulation has the advantage of accounting for idiosyncratic 
differences in response production (e.g., Moran, Mefferd & Kimble, 1964; 
Moran, 1966) in adults if it is assumed that different people tend to rely 
on different production rules.
In order to account for young children's predominantly syntagmatic 
associations, both Clark and McNeill claim that they lack certain 
semantic features. But McNeill simply claims that when young children
^ 'Marked' and 'unmarked' are terns used to describe members of 
pairs of relational and antonymic adjectives and nouns. The unmarked form 
of the pair is the one which not only refers to a particular pole on the 
dimension, but also is the more general and ambiguous of the two. For 
example, in the pair man-woman, man refers not only to the male of the 
species, but also the species as a whole. In this case, woman is the 
marked form, the more specific and less ambiguous term of the pair 
(McNeill, 1970).
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attempt to invoke the minimal contrast rule, they must match on fewer 
semantic features than older children and adults and therefore their 
associations sometimes extend across grammatical categories, incidentally 
implying that even syntactic features which are high on Clark's 
hierarchical order are not necessarily acquired first. Clark, on the 
other hand, claims that children do not even possess the minimal con­
trast rule until they acquire the hierarchically lower binary features 
to which the rule can be applied. Instead, very young children use one 
of the syntagmatic response rules which operate upon the selectional 
feature system they already have for use in producing utterances.
On the other hand, Miller (1969) contrasts the functional with the 
structural aspects of language to account for the shift. The functional 
aspect of language operates to actually produce syntactic sequences such 
as phrases or sentences. Structure, on the other hand, represents the 
syntactic sequence and/or the mechanisms which produce the sequence (the 
function) but the structure does not refer to the actual operation of the 
production process. Miller (1969) advanced a general predicate hypothesis 
in which sentences and word associations are said to be produced by the 
same functional (as opposed to structural) mechanisms; i.e., predication. 
Since the basis propositional content of any elocutionary act (e.g., a 
sentence) is a subject-predicate relation, this too is the basis for a 
word association. The basic predicate relation "is a" is a case in point. 
It imposes a subordinate or inclusion organization upon the constituents 
of a sentence (e.g., dog is an animal), while the predicate relation 
"has a" imposes a part-whole organization upon them (e.g., a dog has a 
bark). Thus certain stimulus words tend to evoke certain other responses
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in a word association test as a result of the functional sentence production 
mechanism of predication. This implies that the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc 
shift may be correlated with the frequency with which different types of 
predications are made. But since there is no evidence bearing on this 
correlation, it remains an open question.
The positions of Miller, McNeill, Clifton and Clark differ in rather 
subtle ways. While the hypotheses of McNeill, Clifton and Clark all 
derive from structural linguistic theories, McNeill assumes that sentences 
and word associations are produced by different mechanisms, the latter by 
a minimal contrast rule. Clifton and Clark, on the other hand, state that 
at least syntagmatic word associations and sentences may be produced by 
the same mechanisms. Miller's predicate hypothesis also assumes that word 
associations and sentences are produced by the same mechanisms but unlike 
the others, it claims these are functional rather than structural in nature.**
Several different investigators at least claim to provide experimental 
support for different aspects of the semantic feature hypothesis. For 
example, Anderson & Beh (1968) tested McNeill's assumption that although 
at first words are directly listed in memory, this type of coding system 
is later replaced by a more efficient feature coding system. They used 
a false recognition technique? with first and second graders and adults,
® Miller (1969) qualifies his statements and specualtes that in fact 
some hypothesis combining semantic features and predications is probably 
necessary to account for linguistic abilities in general and we may 
assume, word association phenomena in particular.
? In a false recognition paradigm, the S is presented with a set of 
stimuli. These are removed and the subject is again presented with a 
set of stimuli which contain items different from, identical to and/or 
similar to the original stimulus items according to certain criteria.
The S's task is to choose from among them which items were in the original 
stimulus set.
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who determined whether each word in a list of 70 had been presented before. 
Paradigmatic and syntagmatic associates of old words were embedded in the 
list as distractors. First graders generally made fewer errors than the 
older groups, but theirs were syntagmatic, while the older groups' were 
paradigmatic. These findings were interpreted as support for McNeill's 
hypothesis that additional semantic features are acquired with age.
Also in accord with McNeill's semantic feature hypothesis, Stolz & 
Tiffany (1972) reasoned that familiarity or frequency of contact with (as 
determined by frequency in the Thorndlke-Lorge word count) and acquisition 
of knowledge about words and their relationships would correlate with the 
shift from distant (response semantically unrelated to the stimulus) or 
syntagmatic to what they called logical responses, which were paradigmatic 
and included synonyms, coordinates, contrasts and superordinates. Hence, 
it was expected that the shift be observed in adult responses to infrequent 
adjectives and their frequent synonyms.
While indeed paradigmatic logical responding was found to increase 
with familiarity, so too did syntactic responding, while unrelated or 
distant responding decreased, a finding similar to that of Entwlsle (1966) 
with children. On this basis the authors concluded that the cause of the 
developmental shift is the acquisition of additional lexical material 
rather than maturation of new or more sophisticated mental processes, in 
accord with McNeill's hypothesis. But it is questionable whether these 
findings with adults can be generalized to developmental phenomena, which 
may be governed by very different laws. Indeed, almost all
studies with children have been careful to use only highly frequent and 
therefore familiar words as test stimuli and yet the shift occurs. Thus, 
Stolz & Tiffany's findings cannot be said to either refute or confirm the
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semantic feature or cognitive interpretations of the syntagmatic- 
paradigmatlc shift.
To determine if the shift corresponded to the learning of superordi- 
nate semantic features, Lippman (1971) presented children with a word 
association test and with noun-noun and adjective-adjective contrasting 
word pairs, asking them for reasons why the words go together. She found 
that a developmental increase in paradigmatic word association responding 
correlated with an increase in nominal justifications (e.g., they're both 
animals) for noun pairs, and dimension (e.g., they're both times) or 
opposite (e.g., they're opposites) justifications for adjective pairs.
Lippman argued that indeed these findings may be attributed to the 
learning of superordinate semantic features in accord with McNeill's 
(1966) hypothesis. Yet many studies (e.g., Flavell & Stedman, 1961;
Reigel, 1970; Francis, 1972; Hall & Halperin, 1972; Nelson, 1974;
Steinberg & Anderson, 1975; Manfleld, 1977) indicate bhat very young children 
at least implicitly or tacitly understand superordinate-subordlnate class 
relations and that younger children's lexical information is not different 
from that of older children and that Lippman's explanation of her findings 
cannot be accurate. Further, while researchers (i.e., Masters, 1968j 
Shepard, 1970) find that children's definitions of words may become more 
sophisticated with age, they are slightly or not at all correlated with 
word associative responding. Thus, it appears that children's own 
definitions of words cannot account for the developmental changes in word 
associative responding, and that the semantic feature hypothesis attributes 
too little semantic knowledge to the young child, who also, it must be 
remembered, uses words correctly in context.
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In sum, an extension and elaboration of McNeill's hypothesis may 
account for certain idlographlc word association phenomena. But a large 
body of evidence Indicates that by the time the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc 
shift occurs, children have long before acquired at least Implicit knowledge 
of the classiflcatory semantic features of familiar, frequent words.
Hence, the semantic organization framework also does not provide a 
satisfactory account of the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc word association 
shift.
4. The Cognitive Interpretive Framework
A cognitive interpretation of developmental word association phenomena 
entails characterizing stimulus-response relationships in conceptual rather 
than grammatical terms, thereby distinguishing several types. These types 
may be ordered on an a priori basis to represent a developmental hierarchy 
(e.g., functional or nonlttglcal responses are lower down on the hierarchy 
than logical ones such as contrast and superordinate associations). To 
provide support for this position, these ordered response types must be 
shown to correspond to different levels of cognitive maturity. While this 
diverges somewhat from the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc dichotomy, this rather 
different perspective may contribute to an adequate explanation of 
developmental word association processes.
The problem of interpreting and assigning a cognitive value to 
particular kinds of responses is highlighted by Jung (1918) who found that 
adults who responded with predicate or syntagmatic associations to verbal 
stimuli exhibited marked imagery, more complex thinking and were remarkably 
resistent to distraction. Thus, adults who emitted syntagmatic responses, 
a response type presumed to be less developmentally advanced, exhibited 
other highly valued cognitive abilities.
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Recall also the contradictory Interpretations of children's and 
adults' syntagmatic responses made by Woodwordh &8ohlosberg (1954) and 
Entwlsle (1966) respectively, with the former claiming that children's 
syntagmatic responses indicated an enlargement upon the concept and the 
latter, that they represented merely syntactic considerations.
Further, superordinate responses, presumed to be a developmentally 
sophisticated response type, are produced even by kindergarteners (Seigel, 
1970), increase to a maximum at grade six and decline thereafter (Palermo 
& Jenkins, 1963), and are more often produced by maladjusted than normal 
adults (Peters, 1952, 1958). Hence, superordinate responding does not 
seem to necessarily represent a more mature level of functioning.
Despite these difficulties, a strong cognitive interpretation of the 
syntagmatic-paradigmatlc shift can be made from the Piagetian point of 
view, which assumes that the logical operational cognitive structure serves 
as a foundation for linguistic or lexical structure. The shift occurs 
coincidentally with the shift from preoperational to concrete operational 
logical functioning. A hallmark of the concrete operational stage is the 
understanding of class inclusion relationships. Within this framework it 
may be hypothesized that cognition-dependent lexical structure is reorganized 
at the time of the preoperational-concrete operational shift into a 
classification hierarchy. This would result in a corresponding change in 
the types of word association responses made.
Moran (1973) adopted this Piagetian approach and assumed that at the 
earliest ages, "action upon" is the central organizational cognitive 
principle to which linguistic input is ordered. To test this assumption, 
Japanese and American (Moran, 1973) and Taiwanese (Moran & Huang, 1974,
27
1975) four- to six-year-olds and adults were administered word association 
tests. A largely Brunerian (1966) classification scheme was used (i.e., 
enactive, ikonic and logical categories, the latter being symbolic) to type 
responses. The Piagetian hypothesis was partially supported since all 
children responded enactively, while the Japanese adults responded iconically 
and the American and Taiwanese adults responded logically. But there was 
no explanation of why the adults of different cultures responded differently 
or how they shifted from enactive responding.
Moran, Meffevd & Kimble (1964) investigated individual sets to respond 
according to a chasacteristic associative principle on word association 
tests. Moran (1966) constructed lists which carefully controlled for the 
tendency of the individual words to elicit different response types and 
administered them to adults. He found four response sets: 1) functional
or object referent, indicating a concrete denotative attitude towards 
words; 2) predication set, consisting of a tendency to give noun responses 
to adjective stimuli, 3) conceptual referent (synonym-superordinate), 
indicating abstract conceptual attitude and 4) a speed set (contrast and 
coordinate responses), indicating a set to respond as fast as possible.
Despite the fact that all four response sets were represented in 
adults, Moran (1966) hypothesized that they constituted a developmental 
hierarchy corresponding to Piagetian cognitive stages. To test this 
hypothesis, Penk (1971) used Moran's (1966) word list with seven through 
eleven-year-olds. He found that the functional or object referent set did 
not decrease with age, while dimensional words increased at age 11, though 
they had been present at all ages. On this basis he concluded that 
different response types did not correspond to differentially sophisticated 
cognitive structures.
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In addition, other studies have not found a relationship between word 
association responses and performance on closely related tasks. This also 
runs counter to the hypothesis that different response types represent 
different levels of cognitive maturity. For example, Cramer (1974) found 
that kindergarteners falsely recognized coordinates more often than 
functional associates, although they spontaneously produced more functional 
than coordinate free word associations. Second and sixth graders showed 
no difference in the types of words they falsely recognized, yet sixth 
graders produced more coordinate than functional free word associations. 
Anderson & Beh (1968) found that the false recognition of superordinate 
associates occurred before the paradigmatic shift occurred. Further, 
seven-year-olds justified both syntagmatic and paradigmatic forced choice 
matches between words by very similar kinds of explanations (Francis, 1970). 
Riley & Fite (1974) constructed lists of syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
paired associates for second and fourth graders and found that the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic lists were learned more quickly by second and 
fourth graders, respectively. This occurred despite the fact that both 
second and fourth graders would presumably respond paradlgmatically on a 
word association test. These results do not support the a priori assump­
tion that class category or logical responses represent a more advanced 
level of cognitive functioning.
Finally, substantial evidence indicates that both young preoperational 
preparadigmatic children (from four- to seven-years) and older concrete 
operational paradigmatic children (over seven-years) possess similar 
linguistic hierarchic semantic organization; i.e., the structure (as 
opposed to the content) of the class inclusion relationships among her 
words are arranged in a hierarchical classification system (e.g., animal
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cat-dog). This Is Indicated by younger children's at least Implicit 
knowledge of the class inclusion relationships embedded in the meanings 
of words (e.g., Nelson, 1974; Steinberg & Anderson, 1975; Mansfield, 1977).
While it appears that the lexicons of both younger and older children 
are arranged in similar hierarchic semantic systems, both younger and 
older children cannot apply this knowledge to task situations with equal 
facility. Indeed, it appears that while this hierarchy is present in
m
young children and is reflected by tasks measuring a more automatic level 
of processing, these children fail to invoke it when they are confronted 
with tasks requiring its more deliberate application. For example, when 
asked to classify words or objects, younger children use functional or 
perceptual relationships instead of the logical (hierarchic classification) 
relationships between them as a basis for their classification, (e.g.,
Vygotsky, 1962; Olver & Hornsby, 1966; Denney, 1974). Older children, on 
the other hand, are trained in school to overtly categorize phenomena 
according to criteria which are not directly perceptible (i.e., abstract 
categories). This appears to make the semantic knowledge which formerly 
operated only unconsciously and automatically available for more deliberate 
implementation in task situations (e.g., Lippman, 1971; Sharp & Cole,
1972; Denney, 1974). As shall be elaborated upon shortly, this factor is 
hypothesized to play an essential role in the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc shift.
In sum, except for four-year-olds whose responses are analyzed in 
terms of their enactive relationship to stimuli, there is relatively little 
evidence suggesting that an a priori ordering of response types corresponds 
to a developmental cognitive one, indicating that the cognitive interpretive 
framework, like the associationist syntactic and semantic framework cannot 
adequately account for the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc word association shift.
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Thus it appears that none of the previously proposed views adequately 
accounts for the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc shift and an alternative must 
be sought. A heretofore unconsidered factor, an analysis of the mode of the repre­
sentational system Involved in the production of word associations may 
aid in our search.
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CHAPTER III - THE ALTERNATIVE
Factor 1: Developmental Differences In the Use
of Imaglnal and Linguistic Representational Systems
The Representational Systems
Recent studies indicate that meanings of verbal items such as 
sentences are represented in an abstract, amodal format or representational 
system (Marschark & Paivio, 1977; Potter, Valian & Falconer, 1977). In 
addition to this amodal system, there are two modality specific systems; 
imaglnal and linguistic. At present, the nature of the amodal represen­
tational system and its relationship to linguistic and imaglnal modes are 
unclear. But the distinction between linguistic and imaglnal modes is 
more fully elucidated and is retained to account for cognitive performance 
differences on materials varying in concreteness. Hence, this distinction 
will be discussed without further reference to the more general underlying 
amodal representational system.
Relationship Between Representational Systems and Word 
Association Processes
Neobehavlorist theory offers a schematic representation of the word 
association process as follows: ^ in i t ia ting~rmed iating-®med iating-R
terminating. In this scheme the S represents the presented stimulus, the 
r represents a symbolic organlsmic response to a class of relevant 
enviromental events of which S is an instance, s represents the feedback 
from the symbolic response and R represents the overt measurable behavior 
(Kendler, 1972; Reese & Lipsitt, 1970; Stevenson, 1970). In the case of 
word association, both the ^initiating and the ^terminating are words,
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verbal items. The mediating responses and stimuli, however, may be either 
images or verbal items, a function of either imaglnal or linguistic 
representational systems. Thus, the imaglnal or ikonic symbolic mediator 
is assumed to consist of a cognitive item which plctorially resembles the 
referent of the stimulus word. This does not imply that the image is 
merely a reembodiment of a stored sensation. Rather, it is the product of 
higher level cognitive and perceptual activities (Kosslyn & Pomerantz,
1977). Space limitations prevent us from more fully exploring various 
issues concerning imagery here (see Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977, for a fuller 
discussion of imagery issues). Suffice it to may that we adopt the position 
that images have emergent properties which cannot be derived from or 
reduced to the processes that produce the image. Hence, they serve a 
distinct cognitive function and cannot be summarily dismissed as mere 
epiphenomena.
On the other hand, a verbal-symbolic mediator is assumed to consist 
of a cognitive item which in no way sensorially or plctorially resembles 
the referent of the stimulus word. Rather, it is arbitrarily related to 
its referent and mediates the word association process by accessing the 
conceptual classification hierarchy in which the stimulus word is embedded 
(i.e., hierarchic semantic organization) or linguistic syntactic 
characteristics.
The Developmental Implications and the Relationship between 
Symbolic Mediators and Word Association Responses
Bruner (1966) suggests that imaglnal and symbolic representational 
systems undergo developmental change; that the young child's cognitive 
processes are predominately ikonic or imaginal, while the older child's and 
adult's processes are predominately symbolic or verbal in nature. This permits
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them to organize the world in terms of the semantic and syntactic structure 
underlying their language. Following Bruner, Paivlo (1971) suggests that 
the young child's verbal processes and word association responses may more 
often be mediated by stimulus-evoked imagery, rather than by verbal- 
symbolic items as are the older child's or adult's responses. Indeed, this 
may partially account for the syntagmatic-paradigmatlc shift.
We claim that there are two bases for the production of syntagmatic 
associations: (1) Linguistic Representation, which utilizes syntactic
features (e.g., selectional restrictions; cf. Chomsky, 1965). This seems 
reasonable since if in a syntagmatic association the two words can follow 
one another in a sentence, then the response word should be produced by 
sentence production principles. (2) Imaglnal Representation, which does 
not access the conceptual frameworks in which the stimulus words are 
embedded. Rather, it accesses specific perceptual attributes of the 
stimulus word (Fodor, 1975). The existing evidence for this position will 
be reviewed shortly.
Logical paradigmatic associations, on the other hand, are assumed to 
be primarily produced by linguistic representation, by hierarchic semantic 
organization in particular.
Clarification of this Position Vis A Vis Bruner
Before the evidence relating to (1) and (2) above is examined, I must 
clarify that my position differs from Bruner's in two ways. First, Bruner 
claims that children sequentially acquire the Ikonic and then the 
symbolic mode of representation. I claim, however, that both these modes 
are present even at the early age of four, since children are sensitive 
to grammatical form class as shown by the fact that they produce paradig­
matic responses with appreciable frequency and noun responses with varying
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frequencies to different grammatical categories. (See Note 1, Entwlsle, 
1966.) Second, unlike Bruner, 1 do not claim that the young child's 
thought consists of imaging, as this is highly implausible (Fodor, 1975). 
Rather, I claim that while images do not constitute the stuff of thought, 
the child more often thinks about properties which are imageable; the 
child'8 thoughts center on properties of her images more often than do the 
adult's or older child's.
Some Evidence for this Position
There is substantial evidence to support this view. For example, 
children often categorize things by form, color or even mere proximity 
(e.g., Vygotsky, 1962; Olver & Hornsby, 1966). Further, children's 
vocabulary contains a preponderance of concrete as opposed to abstract or 
relational words (Brown, 1970). A more direct piece of evidence suggest­
ing that young children use predominately visually or ikonically oriented 
cognitive processes as opposed to those which are verbally oriented 
comes from Cramer (1976). She presented first and fourth graders with 15 
items in either word, picture or word and picture form. The subject's 
task was then to identify the 15 original items from among a 45 item list 
which included 15 distractors, which were the most common associates of 
the 15 original stimuli. First graders made more associative errors in 
the picture condition, while fourth graders made more errors in the word 
than in the picture condition, though for them the difference was not 
significant. Cramer interpreted these findings as Indicating that first 
graders tended to encode the material visually, while fourth graders were 
as likely to encode verbally as visually. She concluded on the basis of 
this and other studies that a clear preference for verbal memory organization 
is predominant for children just beginning school.
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In sum, there is substantial empirical evidence to support the claim 
that younger children rely more heavily on properties of images as a basis 
for cognitive processing than do older children or adults, who more directly 
access verbal-conceptual properties of hierarchic semantic organization.
This does not imply that older children and adults do not produce 
images. It simply means that they more often use cognitive 
abilities which do not rely upon properties of images than younger children 
do.
Response Latencies
It is assumed that the type of representational system used to 
produce the word association responses results in different response 
latencies. Word associations are obviously linguistic items. It is 
predicted that remaining within the linguistic mode throughout the entire 
word association process and producing verbal responses by accessing 
linguistic factors consumes less processing time than producing verbal 
responses by accessing an additional representational system, such as the 
imaglnal one. Hence it is predicted that: a) logical paradigmatic
associations produced by accessing hierarchic semantic knowledge are 
correlated with shorter response latencies than imagery based syntagmatic 
associations! b) syntagmatic associations based on sentence production 
principles (cf. Chomsky, 1965) are correlated with shorter response 
latencies than imagery based syntagmatic associations.
Experimental Support for Response Latency Predictions
Only the first prediction can be supported by existing experimental 
evidence. The contention that paradigmatic responses are produced by 
accessing hierarchic semantic knowledge is supported by Lippman (1971).
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The contention that linguistically mediated logical paradigmatic responses 
have shorter response latencies than lmaginally mediated ones is supported 
by Shaw (1919) who found that the word associative reaction time of adults 
who were described as verbal, was much faster than for adults described 
as concrete-imaginal. Davis (1932) found that self reports of stimulus 
imagery were associated with noun responses. Karowski, Gramlick & Arnott 
(1944) measured the reaction times and types of free association responses 
of adults to 25 items presented as words, line drawings and objects.
Objects and pictures elicited a preponderance of responses in terms of 
associated actions (syntagmatic responses), while words elicited more 
responses in terms of associated objects (paradigmatic responses) and clang 
responses, than objects and line drawings. Further, reaction time for 
words was faster than for either objects or drawings. Siipola, Walker &
Kolb (1955) found that subjects who reported concrete visual stimulus 
images responded more slowly and with more nouns, than subjects who 
responded very quickly and with many paradigmatic contrast (e.g., dark- 
light) associations and had no complex Intervening cognitive processes to 
report. My pilot study also found that when adults are instructed to base 
their word associations on stimulus-evoked images, they have longer 
reaction times and many more syntagmatic responses than when they provide 
"the first word that comes to mind."
In sum, when adults use images as symbolic mediators, or pictures or 
concrete objects as stimuli, they behave much like children in the word 
association task, producing more noun responses and more syntagmatic responses 
in general and taking longer to do so. This provides support for the 
hypotheses that the young child's syntagmatic responses are the result of 
imaginal rather than verbal mediators and that Imagery based syntagmatic
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associations take longer to produce than paradigmatic associations based 
on linguistic hierarchic semantic organization.
In short, we claim that younger children rely on properties of their 
images more than older children. Hence, younger children produce more 
syntagmatic associations than older children.
Remaining Question
This position accounts for the existence of predominately syntagmatic 
associations in younger children, but it does not explain how older 
children come to produce paradigmatic associations. For example, why, if 
both younger and older children possess similar hierarchic semantic 
structures, do only older children apply them ho the word association 
task? The next section attempts to provide an answer to this question.
Factor 2: Acquisition of a Response Mode
The answer to this question may lie in the acquisition of a response 
mode by an epistemlc subject. All previously proposed accounts of the 
shift assume that word associations are produced in the absence of the 
subject's perception of task demands and knowledge of culturally valued 
responses. However, studies varying word association Instructions and 
cross-cultural studies suggest the contrary assumption is more appropriate.
Instructional Studies
Adult Studies. Horton, Marlowe & Crowne (1963) found that instructions 
to respond either "differently from" or "like most people" modified adults' 
associative responses accordingly. Similarly, numerous other studies which 
instructed adults to give responses that "most people" would give showed 
significant gains in commonality over those who are Instructed to simply
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give the first word that comes to mind (e.g., Jenkins, 1959; Wynne, 1964) 
or to respond as quickly as possible (Horton, Marlowe & Crowne, 1963).
Using somewhat different instructions, Wild (1965) tested art students, 
public school teachers and schizophrenics. They were presented with 
character sketches of a) a regulated conventional person and b) an unregu­
lated unconventional person and instructed to respond as each of these 
people would. Art students shifted to greater originality under unregulated 
instructions than teachers and schizophrenics combined. The ability to 
shift was concluded to be a general cognitive approach which was a more 
pervasive ability in certain types of populations than others, suggesting 
hhat certain cognitive dispositions are required to induce a particular 
word associative strategy. This is substantiated by findings that normals, 
as opposed to schizophrenics, more frequently modify their responses to 
accord with instructions to respond like "most people" (Herr, 1957; Wynne, 
1964).
Maltzman, Bogartz & Berger (1958) Instructed adults to respond 
originally and then gave some of them practice in originality responding.
Of these, one-half received verbal reinforcement and half, no reinforce­
ment. An additional group received no special instructions, but was 
verbally reinforced for original responses on additional trials.
Instruction greatly increased the number of original responses, but 
the training effect was greater under the influence of instructions than 
in their absence, although training without instructions also increased 
the number of original responses. This suggests that explicit awareness 
of the strategy to be adopted in word associative responding promotes its 
more efficient use.
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Developmental Studies. In a study investigating instructional 
effects on children, Milgram & Goodglass (1961) presented second through 
eighth graders with a free word association test and with a multiple 
choice word association test in which they were to judge which of two 
words went with a third word. One word was concretely related to the 
third, exemplifying a lower order or peripheral relationship such as 
part-whole (e.g., birdwing), while the other word was abstractly related 
to the third, exemplifying a conceptual, generic relationship such as 
superordinate-subordinate or synonym. Different groups of children with­
in each age level were asked either to choose the word young children in 
the first or second grade would think of to go with the stimulus word, 
or the word adults would think of, or were given no special instructions.
Starting with the fourth grade, children modified their responses 
to accord with test instructions and generally chose fewer abstract re­
sponses for the children role and more for the adult role that in the 
uninstructed condition, although even adults were unable to articulate 
the principle underlying their choice.
Routh & Tweney (1972) bears specifically on the hypothesis that 
paradigmatic responding is associated with strategy acquisition. They 
used a reinforced training procedure to attempt to provide prepara- 
digmatic children with a paradigmatic response strategy by teaching 
them the meaning of different grammatical classes. While it slightly 
increased kindergartener's level of paradigmatic responding to verbs 
and adjectives, it decreased it for nouns, and in no way closed the 
gap between kindergarten and fifth grade children. Hence, Routh &
Tweney concluded that a strategy difference alone cannot account for 
the behavior of preparadigmatic children. This indicates that an
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additional factor, such as mode of representation, as proposed earlier, 
may be required to account for the syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift.
Further, Routh & Tweney used grammatical form class as the key element 
in attempting to promote paradigmatic responding. This may account for 
its poor results as I claim, on the other hand, that explicit access to 
hierarchic semantic organization is far more important.
Cross-Cultural Studies
Ervin & Landar (1963) tested Navaho subjects aged 17-70 and found 
a small but reliable tendency for subjects who had schooling and who 
were English dominant (judged by their picture naming latencies) to give 
more paradigmatic responses than those who were Navaho dominant.
Sentence responses appeared in 9/11 subjects who were either Navaho 
dominant or had had no schooling, but only 3/15 English dominant or 
educated subjects gave such responses.
Ervin & Landar suggest that the prevalence of sentence responses in 
the uneducated group may be attributed to the possibility that the concept
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of a "word" as a short, discrete unit is acquired through reading. They 
also suggest that in the English or educated population, the task may more 
often be Interpreted as one of returning like for like. Indeed, in testing 
third grade children, Ervin had encountered children who asked if their 
associative responses were right, as though they were searching for a rule 
to follow.
Sharp & Cole (1972) also present evidence that formal 
education is related to paradigmatic responding. They tested African Kpelle 
subjects attending the first or second grade of the government elementary 
schools, aged eight and nine; fourth and fifth graders, aged twelve to 
fourteen and eleventh and twelfth graders, aged eighteen to twenty-one; 
and unschooled subjects of equivalent ages. They found that paradigmatic 
responding to verbs and adjectives was low by European and American 
standards and that there is an increase in paradigmatic responding both 
as a function of age and educational level, but that the increase is 
greater if the subject has attended school.
Sharp & Cole suggest that changes in the taxonomic language prompted 
by schooling result in associative, as well as dassiflcatory changes. 
However, Masters (1968) and Shepard (1970) provide little if any 
experimental support for this conjecture, as the types of definitions 
dhildren constructed (presumably an indication of their taxonomic language) 
correlated only weakly or not at all with their word association 
responses. Further, there is rather substantial evidence that children 
are at least implicitly aware of classification hierarchies embedded 
in the meaning of words, as was reviewed earlier (see section on 
semantic interpretative framework). Rather, it seems more likely that 
the change is from implicit to explicit knowledge of the taxonomy, which 
when explicit, can be used to generate word association responses.
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Even within Western culture itself, education appears to influence 
paradigmatic responding. French construction workers respond syntag- 
matlcally, like French and American children on a free word association 
test, while French college students respond paradigmatically (Rosenzweig, 
1964).
In sum, these studies suggest that rather than involving an unmonitored 
process as has been historically assumed, word association responding may 
typically involve a strategy or set, deliberately or unconsciously chosen 
by the subject to accord with perceived task demands. In this way, the 
syntagmatlc-paradigmatic word association shift may be partially accounted 
for. It may simply reflect the developing child's changing definition of 
the word association task and consequently her changing response 
strategies.
The Response Mode
Paradigmatic associations are hypothesized to be produced through a 
response mode which is acquired through categorization experience obtained 
through education. This makes the implicit knowledge of hierarchic 
semantic organization available for explicit application to task situations 
which also concomitantly teaches the child that responses based on 
hierarchic semantic organization are desirable. But because it is the 
categorization knowledge and not the knowledge of the symbolic mediators, 
(words and images per se)j that is explicit, the child is unaware of and 
unable to voluntarily control the mediatlonal basis of association 
responses. Thus, at first, logical paradigmatic associations are produced 
automatically and unconsciously, just as her earlier syntagmatic associa­
tions were, through the unconscious and unplanned reliance upon sentence
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production principles or the properties of her images for further cognitive 
processing.
Lippman's (1971) study, mentioned earlier, provides evidence for this 
view. She presented children with a free word association test and with 
noun-noun and adjective-adjective contrasting word pairs and asked them 
for reasons why the two words "go together." She found that a develop­
mental Increase in paradigmatic responding correlated with an increase in 
nominal justification (e.g., they're both animals) for noun pairs and 
dimension (e.g., they're both times) or opposite (e.g., they're both 
opposites) justifications for adjective pairs.
Lippman argued that this was a result of the child's learning of 
superordinate semantic features in accord with McNeill's (1966, 1970) 
explanation of the shift. But along with Nelson (1977), I suggest that it 
is more reasonable to Interpret these results as an indication of the 
child'8 growing ability to use the knowledge which had long ago been 
acquired and implemented in everyday utterances but was not explicitly 
conceptualized.
Routh & Tweney (1972) bears specifically on the hypothesis that 
paradigmatic responding is associated with strategy acquisition. They used 
a reinforced training procedure to attempt to provide preparadigmatlc 
children with a paradigmatic response stragety by teaching them the meaning 
of different grammatical classes. While it slightly increased kindergar­
tener's level of paradigmatic responding to verbs and adjectives, it 
decreased it for nouns, and in no way closed the gap between kindergarten 
and fifth grade children. Hence, Routh & Tweney concluded that a strategy 
difference alone cannot account for the behavior of preparadigmatlc 
children. This indicates that indeed additional factors such as mode of
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representation, as proposed earlier, are also required to account for the 
syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift. Also, Routh & Tweney used grammatical 
form class as the key element in attempting to promote paradigmatic 
responding. This may account for its poor results, for as claimed above 
explicit access to linguistic hierarchic semantic organization is far more 
important.
The previously discussed cross-cultural and instructional studies also 
provide indirect evidence for this view. While the instructional studies 
discussed seem to indicate that the subject is self-consciously aware of 
the strategy, it is important to note that these situations differ from 
that of the free word association test in a small but very important way.
In instructional studies the strategy is externally imposed by the 
experimenter. But the response mode involved in the production of para­
digmatic associations in the free word association test is subject imposed; 
it originates within the individual and therefore may operate without 
the subject's explicit awareness of her behavior. Only when the ohild 
acquires metaknowledge of words and images, when she becomes aware of the 
symbolic mediators themselves as distinct entities apart from their 
referents is she able to self-consciously control her word association 
process to accord with externally imposed explicit instructions. It is 
this factor which I shall now discuss.
factor 3: Metaknowledge of Language and Images
Gaining deliberate control over word association responding, a 
language phenomenon, means that the child can willfully base her word 
association responses on either a) stimulus evoked imagery or b) linguistic 
factors, hierarchic semantic organization or syntactic features. It seems
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likely that in order to do this, the child must acquire the explicit had 
self-conscious understanding that language itself is a distinct entity 
possessing its own unique characteristics. In other words, it seems 
reasonable that the self-conscious and deliberate control and choice of 
word association processes, a language phenomenon, is contingent upon the 
acquisition of metalinguistic knowledge. Metalinguistic knowledge is 
knowledge that language is an arbitrary symbol system in which words are 
conceived of as interchangeable, grammatical, nonphysical units. At 
first, children believe that words possess the physical properties of their 
referents and do not understand that sentences are composed of individual 
units or words. Later they understand the arbitrary relationship between 
the verbal symbol and its referent and know that words are systemic elements 
possessing distinct grammatical properties. They recognize language as 
an entity in its own right (Piaget, 1951; Papandroupoulou & Sinclair, 1974; 
Osherson & Markman, 1975).
It seems likely that in addition to this, the child must acquire 
explicit knowledge of imagery, knowledge that their images are distinct from 
a) the objects they represent and b) the corresponding words. At first 
children may not distinguish their images from the corresponding objects 
and words, but rather think they are one and the same thing. Later, 
children believe that images are distinct from objects and words as well.
Evidence gained from contrasting pictures with words indicates that 
children may acquire explicit knowledge of imagery before metalinguistic 
knowledge (Markman, 1976). This may occur since children may coreectly 
answer that images are distinct from objects and seemingly understand 
that images are distinct from words, but only because they do not 
distinguish words and objects. Hence, if the object is distinct from the
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Image, and the word Is considered to be the object, the word will be 
distinct from the image as well. In this case the child must acquire 
metalinguistic as well as explicit knowledge of imagery in order to have 
completely voluntary control over her cognitive processes.^
Experimental Evidence for this Position
Experimental evidence supports the view that children develop the 
ability to voluntarily control their cognitive processes in general. For 
example, Appel, Cooper, Knight, McCarrell, Yussen & Flavell (1972) found 
that while older children can, very young children cannot appropriately 
modify their cognitive behavior in response to instructions to either merely 
"look at" or "memorize" experimental materials.
More specifically, Osherson & Markman (1975) found that metalinguistic 
knowledge level was correlated with children's ability to understand 
tautologies and contradictions, to treat them as nonempirical statements. 
Gerschitz & Glick (Note 1) found that nominal realism level, an indication 
of metalinguistic knowledge, was correlated with children's propensity to 
spontaneously use color labels as mnemonic devices. Hence, empirical 
evidence supports the view that voluntary control of language-related 
cognitive processes is correlated with if not contingent upon the acquisi­
tion of metalinguistic knowledge.
In Brief
In brief, it is hypothesized that the syntagmatlc-paradigmatic shift 
is accounted for as follows: At first the child bases her word associa­
tion responses on properties of her images, and so she produces syntag­
matic associations. But exposure to education and practice in overt, 
abstract categorization makes hierarchic semantic knowledge (which
B When considered together, both metalinguistic knowledge and explicit 
knowledge of imagery shall be referred to as "metaknowledge."
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previously functioned unconsciously and automatically) available for 
application to tasks requiring its more deliberate use. Hence, she now 
produces paradigmatic associations. Yet even once this type of responding 
occurs, the child is not able to voluntarily switch her mode of responding 
from one type of linguistic basis to another, i.e., from hierarchic 
semantic knowledge to syntactic factors, or from a linguistic basis to an 
Imaginal one. Only with the acquisition of metaknowledge is the child able 
to flexibly control the type of symbolic mediators she uses to generate 
her word association responses so that they consist of either (a) 
properties of stimulus evoked images or (b) different types of linguistic 
factors such as hierarchic semantic knowledge or syntactic sentence 
production principles.
The Experiment
In order to test these hypotheses, kindergarten and second grade 
children and adults were administered a word association task in which the 
stimuli were low and high imagery nouns, verbs and adjectives. This list 
was administered to each subject five times, each time with different 
instructions as follows: (a) the standard "first word" instructions;
(b) syntagmatic instructions; (c) paradigmatic instructions; (d) imagery 
instructions; and finally (e) time delay instructions. Kindergarten 
and second grade subjects received two convergent measures of metalinguis­
tic knowledge, two convergent measures of explicit knowledge of imagery, 
a test of hierarchic semantic knowledge, and a test of word-word 
relationships.
While there are several components of metalinguistic knowledge, only 
two were measured: the distinction between meaning and reference, and
the distinction between words and referents. These had analogues in
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explicit knowledge of imagery tasks; the distinction between (a) Images 
and objects and (b) images and words. These two types of metaknowledge 
sub-tasks were chosen as they have at least face validity in terms of 
measuring whether words, images and bbjects are subjectively considered 
to be separate and distinct entities. Further, other investigators (e.g., 
Osherson & Markman, 1975; Markman, 1976) and my pilot study show that 
children perform somewhat inconsistently at least on metalinguistic know­
ledge tasks. Therefore, probably no one task can be said to definitively 
measure metaknowledge. Consequently performance on both subtasks will be 
considered to determine if the child has metaknowledge of language or 
images.
The test of hierarchic semantic knowledge was used to insure that 
both younger and older children possess equivalent semantic organizational 
structures. The particular task chosen does not require strategic 
application of knowledge to solve a problem, but rather reflects implicit 
categorization knowledge. In this task children are shown drawings of 
common objects. Following their removal the child is asked whether she
saw a picture which made her think of a _____ , where the blank is one of
five retrieval cues which is related to the target picture in one of five 
class inclusion relationships. For example, if the target picture is 'car' 
the retrieval cue might be 'bus'. Thus, it is assumed that this task 
reflects processes which function automatically, without the subject's 
deliberation or forethought.
The test of word-word relationships was used to determine whether 
overt and explicit conceptualization of linguistic-semantic organization, 
assumed to be an indication of the child's experience with abstract 
categorization, is correlated with Increased paradigmatic responding. In
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this test children are asked to articulate why two words (which are 
related to one another in superordinate, coordinate, contrast or synonym 
relationships) go together. In order to perform this task, it is obvious 
that the hierarchic semantic knowledge the child possessed earlier (as is 
indicated by the test of hierarchic semantic organization) must be used 
in a more self-conscious and deliberate fashion. Hence, if such self- 
conscious possession of semantic knowledge underlies paradigmatic 
responding, knowledge of word-word relationships would be correlated with 
incidence of paradigmatic responding.
Summary of Hypotheses 
Imagery and Word Association
1. The preponderance of syntagmatic responses produced by young 
children is the result of the fact that their word associations are 
mediated by stimulus-evoked images, rather than by hierarchic semantic 
organization.
To confirm this hypothesis, (a) high imagery words should evoke more 
syntagmatic responses than low imagery words in the 'first word' and 
'imagery' word association tests, for all age groups, and (b) second grade 
children and adults should provide more syntagmatic responses in the 
imagery condition than they do in the 'first word' condition.
2. When an image is not readily available to mediate word associ­
ations, linguistic factors should mediate the association instead.
To confirm this hypothesis, low imagery words should elicit more 
logical paradigmatic associations (which are presumed to be mediated by 




3. It is assumed that:
(a) The early syntagmatic responses of younger children (In all 
word association tests) are based on properties of stimulus- 
evoked Imagery;
(b) The later syntagmatic responses of older children and adults 
In the first word and Imagery conditions are also Imagery 
based;
(c) In the syntagmatic test, in which Ss are instructed to give 
syntagmatic responses based on sentence production principles 
(and therefore the syntactic factors of linguistic 
organization), syntagmatic responses are based on sentence 
production principles;
(d) Logical paradigmatic responses are based on hierarchic 
semantic organization, another linguistic factor.
It is further hypothesized that responses made on the basis of 
stimulus-evoked images take longer to occur than those based on linguistic 
factors. In order to confirm this hypothesis, the response latencies 
produced as a result of (a) and (b) should be longer than those produced 
in (c) and (d).
Cognitive Variables and Word Association
4. Both young children and adults possess similar hierarchical 
semantic organization (Steinberg & Anderson, 1975).^ This finding is 
replicated to insure that this factor does not contribute to the
9t‘Presumably Steinberg & Anderson's task does not require the child 
to apply her knowledge strategically to solve a problem. Rather, it 
accesses processes and knowledge which operate automatically and uncon­
sciously.
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syntagraatic-paradigmatic shift. To replicate this finding there should 
be no significant difference in the semantic organization of younger and 
older children on this task. To infirm it, older children should have 
a different kind of structure than younger children.
5. As children gain experience in explicitly using the hierarchic 
categorization system they are able to apply that knowledge automatically 
to task situations such as word association, and to produce paradigmatic 
responses. When this first occurs, it need not be accompanied by the 
ability to articulate the fact that one is responding paradigmatlcally, 
since it is assumed that this requires a certain level of metaknowledge.
To confirm this hypothesis, explicit knowledge of hierarchic semantic 
relationships should be correlated with an increased level of paradigma­
tic responding on the 'first word' test. Also, early Increased paradig­
matic responding should not necessarily be correlated with the explicit, 
verbal awareness that one is producing paradigmatic responses. Rather, 
such awareness should be accompanied by a higher level of metaknowledge.
6. Children must acquire a higher level of metalinguistic knowledge 
and explicit knowledge of imagery (metaknowledge) in order to willfully 
change the basis of their word associations to accord with task demands.
To confirm this hypothesis, children with higher levels of meta­
knowledge will modify their word associations in different instruction 
conditions more successfully than children with lower levels of meta­
knowledge. Thus, only children who have higher levels of metaknowledge 
should produce more paradigmatic responses in the paradigmatic word asso­
ciation test than in the 'first word' test.
Three basic stages in the development of the voluntary modification 
of word association behavior are predicted:
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(a) The child produces predominantely syntagmatic responses in all
word association tests. She is using properties of her images as
symbolic mediators for her word association responses.
(b) The child produces predominately paradigmatic responses in all
word association conditions. She has gained experience with the hierarchic
semantic categorization system and while she has explicit access to it, 
she does not yet have a high enough level of metaknowledge to be able to 
control voluntarily her word association process. This is the result
of the fact that only her categorization knowledge is explicit, but not 
her knowledge of symbolic mediators, such as words or images. Both are 
needed to control cognitive processes voluntarily.
(c) The child has attained full control and self-conscious under­
standing of the cognitive processes governing word association responding 
and appropriately modifies her responses to accord with overt task 
demands. She has gained a high enough level of metaknowledge to permit 
this understanding and control, as well as explicit knowledge of hier­
archic semantic organization.
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CHAPTER IV - METHOD
Subjects The subjects were 40 children, 20 kindergarteners (aged 
58-69 mos.; 7 males and 13 females) and second graders (aged 80-92 mos.;
8 males and 12 females). The kindergarteners were drawn from the Hunter 
College Elementary School, and were heterogeneous in race, but homogene­
ously high in academic ability and were generally from middle and upper 
class homes. The second graders were attending a Manhattan summer day 
camp and were mainly from middle and upper middle class homes. Many 
attended private grammar schools during the regular school year. This 
group was also racially heterogeneous and comparable to the kindergarten 
group in socio-economic background, and presumably academic ability.
There were also 10 volunteer college age adults, 2 males and 8 females 
who were attending introductory and child psychology courses at the 
summer session of Hunter College.
Design All Ss were tested individually by the same female 
experimenter who led them to a private quiet testing room. Testing was 
accomplished in five sessions administered within a space of two weeks.
In the first session, the standard free word association test was adminis­
tered first to all children and adults to avoid the influence of practice 
effects on this measure. Ten kindergarteners and ten second graders also 
received: 1) two convergent measures of metalinguistic knowledge (which
tap the child's understanding of words as arbitrary, interchangeable, 
grammatical units); 2) two convergent measures of explicit knowledge of 
imagery, which tap the child's understanding of the distinction between
a) images and words and b) images and objects; 3) the hierarchic semantic 
organization and 4) the word-word relationship task. The tests were 
administered in a different randomized order for each subject. Some of
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these tests were administered to a few of the kindergarten subjects in 
the second session, as their attention span was not long enough to permit 
full administration in one session.
A control group consisted of the remaining ten kindergarten and ten 
second grade children who received only the standard free word association 
test and no other task in the first session. The purpose of this control 
group was to determine if administration of the metalinguistic knowledge 
and other tasks influenced subsequent word association responding. The 
adults also received only the word association tasks, on the assumption 
that they would perform at or near ceiling level on the others. In the 
second through fifth sessions all Ss received the same stimulus word list 
as used in the first free word association test, each time with different 
associative instructions; paradigmatic, syntagmatic, imagery and time 
delay instructions, respectively. The time delay condition required that 
the subject wait three seconds before responding. Its purpose was to 
insure that it was not simply the delay in responding in the imagery 
condition that was responsible for a possible increase in syntagmatic 
responding. (See Table 1 for an outline of the design.)
Approximately one-fourth of the word association responses and all 
of the cognitive tasks were scored by two independent raters and an 
interrater reliability Pearson-product moment correlation obtained.
Experimental Tasks
1. Word Association Tasks
Stimuli. The word list consisted of 48 words from three grammatical 
form classes - nouns, verbs and adjectives. One-half of the words in each 













THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY
FIRST SESSION
Age Groups 5 year old 7 year olds Adults
Subject # 1 ... 20 21 ... 40 41 ... 50 n=50
RESPONSE MEASURES
1. Free Word Associa­
tion Test adminis­
tered first
Response latencies and proportions of syntagmatic 
paradigmatic, logical and miscelleaneous response 
types for high and low imagery nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives.
Subiect // 1 ... 10 only 21 ... 30 only None n=20
2. Convergent meas­
ures of metalinguis­
tic knowledge; A. 
Meaning and Refer­
ence (Markman,1976).
Proportion of correct responses
B. Distinction be­
tween word & referenl 
(Markman, 1976)
Proportion of correct responses
3. Convergent meas­
ures of explicit 
knowledge of imagery 
A. Object and Image
Proportion of correct responses
B. Nonphysical pro­
perties
1. Image and object
2. Image and word
Proportion of correct responses
4. Word-word rela­
tionship task





Proportion of correct logical justifications
SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH SESSIONS
Subiect # 1 ... 20 21 ... 40 1 41 ... 50 n=50
6.Paradigmatic, syn­
tagmatic, imagery & 
time delay word 
association tests 
(administered in 
random order over 
the second,through 
fifth sessions.
As in "First Word" Association Test
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difficulty, according to norms in Paivio, Yullle & Madigan (1968), Spreen 
& Schultz (1966) and Paivio (unpublished norms). Following the procedure 
of Brown & Berko (1960) all verbs were preceded by the word "to" to 
insure certainty as to their part of speech. (See Appendix A for complete 
list specifications.) There were ten different constant random orders of 
words, five of which were administered to any one subject.
Procedure
A. Standard Free Word Association Instructions 
(Adopted from Entwisle, 1966)
This task was administered first to all subjects. Adults were Informed 
that these instructions were also meant for children and would therefore 
sound a bit juvenile. The subject was told, "I'm going to play a game
with you. You may not have played this game before so let me tell you
what it's about. I'm going to read you some words one at a time. Each 
time I read a word I would like you to tell me the first word you think 
of. When you tell me the word, I'll write it down and then read you 
another word. To make sure you understand the game let's try a few 
practice words. I'll say a word and then you tell me the first woed you 
think of. O.K.? The first word is 'cat'. That's fine. Now let's try 
another practice word and then we'll start the regular game. The next
word is 'grass'. That's right. Now we'll play the game and see if you
can think of a word to tell me for every word I read to you. All right?"
E then read the list one word at a time and recorded the S's
responses and latencies by use of a stopwatch which was started immedi­
ately following the utterance of the stimulus word and stopped immediately 
upon the subject's response, E then asked, "Did you try to say only
certain kinds of words? How did you think of the words that you said?"
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Four subsequent questions were "Did you get a picture of the word in 
your head first and then say a word?, Did you try to make up part of a 
sentence? Did you look around the room to get ideas? Did you try to 
give a word like my word, a word that meant the same thing as my word, or 
a word that meant something different, the opposite?" E recorded the S's 
responses.
B. Paradigmatic Instructions
This task was administered in one of the four subsequent sessions.
The subject was told, "We're going to play a word game again just like the 
first game we played last time. I'm going to read a list of words out 
loud to you one at a time and I would like you to say the first word you 
think of after I say my word. But this time we're going to do something 
special. This time I'd like you to try to think of a word that is like 
my word, that could be used in a sentence the same way as my word. Just 
to make sure you know what I mean, let's try an example. Suppose my word 
was 'boy'. I'm going to use the word 'boy' in a sentence, "The little boy 
ran down the street." E says, "Now suppose we take the 'boy' out of the 
sentence and put another word in instead. What word could we put in?"
If S did not reply correctly, E provided the example, "girl". E then 
said, "O.K., now we're going to do another example. I'm going to use the 
word 'brown' in a sentence. "The ugly brown truck drove away." Now, 
suppose we take the word 'brown' out of the sentence and put another word 
in instead. What word could we put in?" If S did not reply correctly,
E provided the example, "red". E then said, "Just to make sure you know 
what I'd like you to do, now let's try a couple of practice words before 
we begin the regular list. The first practice word is 'cat'. What word 
do you think of when I say the word 'cat'? If S provided a syntagmatic
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response, she was corrected by the E who said, "No, that is not what I 
mean. The kind of word I'd like you to think of when I say 'cat' is 
'dog'." This procedure was repeated with the second practice word, 
'happy', for which the E's correction example was 'said'. After both 
practice words were administered E said, "O.K. we're ready to begin. Just 
say the first word you think of after I say my word but try to find a 
word like mine, like the one I say so that it could be used like mine in 
a sentence."
The word list was then read, the S's responses recorded and latencies 
measured with a stopwatch as in the first test. After every tenth word,
or as necessary, the subject was reminded that she must give a word like
9the experimenter's.
C. Syntagnmtlc Instructions
The subject was told, "We're going to play a game again just like the 
first game we played last time. I'm going to read a list of words out 
loud to you one at a time and I would like you to say the first word you 
think of after I say my word. But this time I'd like you to do something
special. I'd like you to try to think of a word that is different from
the word I say, that would come right after or right before the word in 
a sentence so that the two words together make up part of a sentence.
Just to make sure you know what I mean, let's try a couple of examples. 
Suppose the word was 'boy'. I'm going to use the word 'boy' in a 
sentence. "The little boy ran down the street." Now what word comes right
after the word 'boy' in the sentence? What word comes right before the
9 Pilot study results indicated that children forgot the original 
instructions as the list was presented and had to be reminded of them.
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word 'boy' In the sentence? O.K. So 'ran' and 'little' come after and 
before the word 'boy' in the sentence. They are not like thm ward 'boy'. 
Let's try another example now. Suppose the word was 'brown'. I'm going 
to use the word 'brown' in a sentence. "The ugly brown truck drove away." 
What word comes right after the word 'brown' in the sentence? O.K. So 
'truck' is not like the word 'brown'. It comes after the word 'brown' in 
the sentence. O.K. We're reddy to begin the list, but before we do let's 
try a couple of practice words to make sure you know what I'd like you to 
do and what I'd like you to do is say a word that would come before or 
after my word in a sentence. You're not supposed to say a whole sentence, 
just one word that would come before or after my word in a sentence. O.K. 
The first practice word is 'cat'. What word do you think of when I say 
'cat' that is not like the word 'cat'?" If the S responded appropriately 
she was reinforced. If not, E said, "An example of the kind of word I'd 
like you to think of when I say 'cat' is 'meow' or 'black'." This 
procedure was repeated with the second practice word 'happy', for which 
the E's example of an apprlpriate response was 'child'. E asked S if she 
now understood what she must do and then said "O.K. Now we're ready to 
begin the regular list. Remember, say the first word you think of after 
I say my word, but try to give a word that is different than mine, different 
than the one I say so that it could be right before or right after mine 
in a sentence.
The word list was read, the S's responses recorded and latencies 
measured with a stopwatch as in the first test. After every tenth word, 
or as necessary, the subject was reminded that she must give a word 
different from the experimenter's.
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D. Imagery Instructions
The subject was told, "We're going to play a word game again just like 
the first game we played last time. I'm going to read a list of words of 
out loud to you one at a time, and I would like you to say the first word 
you think of after I say my word. But this time, I'd like you to do 
something special. I'd like you to get a picture of my word in your head 
first. Then, once you have the picture of the word in your head, I'd like 
you to try to say the first word you think of. Just to make sure you 
know what I mean, let's try a couple of practice words. Now I'd like you 
to dose your eyes and get a picture of this word. When you have the 
picture, then I’d like you to say the first word you think of. The first 
practice word is 'cat'. Get a picture of a cat in your head and then tell 
me the first word you think of." After the S responded E asked her if she 
had gotten a picture of a cat in her head first, verbally reinforced her 
if she said that she had and repeated the instructions to obtain the 
picture before responding if she said she hadn't. The second practice 
word 'happy' was then administered and this procedure repeated. After this 
E 8aid, "Now we're ready to begin the regular list. Remember to say the 
first word you think of after I say my word, but first get a picture of 
my word in your head."
The word list was read, the S's responses recorded and latencies 
measured as in the first test. After every tenth word or as necessary, 
the subject was reminded to close her eyes and that she must get a picture 
of the word in her head before she says her word.
E. Time Delay Instructions
The S was told, "We're going to play a game again just like the first 
game we played last time. I'm going to read a list of words out loud to
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you one at a time, and I would like you to say the first word you think 
of after I say my word. But this time, I'd like you to do something 
special. This time I'm going to tap my pen on the desk like this when 
I'd like you to say your word. Just to make sure you know what I mean, 
let's try a couple of practice words. Now, when I say my word, you wait 
until I tap my pen on the desk to say your word. The first practice word 
is 'cat'." The E then started the stopwatch, and at the end of three 
seconds tapped her pen on the desk. The S was either corrected or 
verbally reinforced, depending on whether she waited for the tap or not. 
This procedure was repeated for the second practice word 'grass' and the 
regular list was then administered, the S's responses recorded and 
latencies measured in the usual fashion, with the stopwatch being started 
Immediately following itterance of the stimulus word, and a tap at 
three seconds thereafter. The watch was stopped upon the S's utterance 
of her response. Thus the latencies included the three second waiting 
Interval. As necessary, the S was reminded that she must wait for the tap 
before she could say her word.
Scoring Procedure
Word association responses were classified according to their gram­
matical relationship to the stimulus word, as paradlgmatic-syntagmatic. 
Only major grammatical classes were used to categorize stimuli and 
responses (e.g., noun, verb, adjective, adverb) article, etc.).
Paradigmatic responses were also conceptually classified into logical 
responses as outlined below. The proportion of the total number of 
responses of the following four major response types for high and low 
imagery nouns, verbs and adjectives was used in statistical anc&yses:
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1) paradigmatic, 2) syntagmatic, 3) logical and 4) miscellaneous.
Grammatical Classifications
1. Paradigmatic. Stimulus and response are of the same grammatical 
form class and have similar privileges of occurrence in discourse (e.g., 
apple-fruit).
2. Syntagmatic. Stimulus and response are of different form 
olasses and may follow one another in a sentence (e.g., apple-red).
Conceptual Classifications 
Logical Classifications for Paradigmatic Associations only
3. Superordjnate. The stimulus word denotes an immediate member 
of the class or category denoted by the response word (e.g., apple-frult) 
(Sullivan & Moran, 1967).
4. Subordinate. The response word denotes an immediate member of 
the class or category denoted by the stimulus word (e.g., time-hour).
5. Synonym. The response word has exactly the same meaning as the 
stimulus word in one or more ordinary and appropriate contexts (e.g., 
car-auto) (Sullivan & Moran, 1967).
6. Coordinate. The stimulus word and response word separately 
denote immediate members (of equal logical order) of the same class or 
category (e.g., red-green) (Sullivan & Moran, 1967).
7. Contrast. The response word negates or contrasts with the mean­
ing of the stimulus word in one or more ordinary and appropriate contexts 
(e.g., dark-light) (Sullivan & Moran, 1967).
8. Negation. The response word is preceded by not (e.g., proud- 
not proud) or the prefix un, where it is inappropriate (e.g., dark- 
undark). (Entwisle (1966) also classified these responses as paradigmatic.)
Miscellaneous
9. Clang Associates. Are those which rhyme with or are in any way 
based upon the phonetic characteristics of the stimulus (Sullivan & Moran, 
1967).
10. Multiword Associates. Consist of more than one word, excluding 
not (Sullivan & Moran, 1967).
11. Blank. No response within 20 seconds.
12. Unscorable Responses. Are those which do not fit into any of 
the listed categories. This includes a repetition of the stimulus word 
or a derivative of it (to hope-hope; hoping; hopes; am hoping), or a 
response which appears to be totally unrelated to the stimulus (e.g., car- 
ate; dress-nose) and which could not be classified as syntagmatic or 
paradigmatic on the basis of sentence completion or substitution criteria.
Articulation of Response Pattern
Answers to the questions, "Did you try to say only certain kinds of 
words?, etc." were scored on a pass/fail basis. Subjects were scored as 
passing if they said they responded with opposites or a word like the 
experimenter's, or in some way Indicated that their responses were para­
digmatic, assuming, of course that a majority of their responses were in 
fact paradigmatic. Any other type of response was scored as a failure, 
whether they deliberately tried to produce such responses was also noted, 




A. Knowledge of the Distinction Between
Meaning and Reference (Adapted from Markman, 1976)
Procedure
The subject was told, "Now we're going to talk about some words."
The word 'word' was emphasized whenever It appeared in the instructions.
The S is asked, a) "Do you know what the word 'giraffe' means? (Subject 
responds.) b) Suppose for some reason all of the giraffes in the whole 
world disappeared. There is not one giraffe left in the whole world.
What has disappeared, the word 'giraffe' or the giraffes? c) Haa the word 
'giraffe' disappeared? d) How that all the giraffes are goen, does the word 
'giraffe' mean 'nothing' or does it mean 'an animal with a long neck'? 
e) Can you give me a word for something you cannot find anywhere in the 
world?"
This procedure was repeated for the word 'apple' with the exception 
of (e).
B. Distinction Between Word and Referent 
(Adapted from Markman, 1976)
Procedure
The subject was told, "Now I'm going to ask you some more questions.
1. a) What is made of steel, the word 'car' or a car? b) Is the 
word 'car' made of steel?
2. a) What will make you wet, the word 'rain' or rain? b) Will the 
word 'rain' make you wet?
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3. a) What is made of feathers, the word 'bird' or a bird? b) Is 
the word 'bird' made of feathers?
4. a) What can you buy a piece of bubble gum with, the word 'penny' 
or a penny? b) Can you buy a piece of bubble gum with the word
'penny'?
5. a) What is made of rubber, the word 'ball' or a ball? b) Is the 
word 'ball' made of rubber?
Scoring Procedures
A. Meaning and Reference (Adapted from Markman, 1976)
Each correct answer received one point and the total number of correct 
responses was obtained.
Ss were scored as correct if they said that the giraffes disappeared 
in (b), denied that the word 'giraffe' had disappeared in (c), choose 
'animal with a long neck' in (d), and provided an invented word or a word 
which truly had no extant referent (e.g., dinosaur) in (e). Scoring is 
the same for the 'apple' item.
B. Distinction Between Word and Referent 
(Adapted from Markman, 1976)
Each correct answer received one point and the total was obtained.
To be counted as correct, both parts (a) and (b) of each question had to 
be answered correctly.
C. Summary Score
The total number of correct answers on parts A and B was obtained.
65
3. Explicit Knowledge of Imagery Tasks
(Parts A, B and B' always administered together, although in counter­
balanced order.)
A. Distinction Between Objects and Images (Comparable to A 
in Metalinguistic Tasks)
a) Can you close your eyes and get a picture of a zebra in your 
head? Do you have it? What does it look like? b) Suppose for some reason 
all of the zebras in the whole world disappeared. There is not one zebea
left in the whole world. What has disappeared, the picture of the zebra
in your head or the zebras? c) Now that all the zebras are gone, is the 
picture of the zebras in your head gone too? What does it look like? Is 
it 'nothing' or does it look like a striped animal?
This procedure is repeated for the picture of a tomato.
Scoring Procedure
Each correct answer received one point and the total was obtained.
Ss were scored as correct if they choose 'the zebras' in (b) and
denied that the picture had disappeared in (c) and described it in much 
the same way as in (a). Scoring is the same for the tomato item.
B. Distinction Between Image and Object (Parts B and B' are
Comparable to Part B ef Metalinguistic Knowledge Tasks)
Procedure
The child was asked to close her eyes and to get a picture of a car 
in her head, to think of what a car looks like. The following questions 
were then asked: a) What is made of steel, is the picture of the car in
your head made of steel, or is a car on the street made of steel? b) Is
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the picture of the car in your head made of steel? Is there really steel 
in your head?
The child was then asked to get a picture of a bird in her head and 
was asked? a) What is made of feathers? Is the picture of a bird in your 
head made of feathers or is a bird outside in a tree made of feathers?
b) Is the picture of the bird in your head made of feathers? Are there
really feathers in your head?
B'. Distinction Between Image and Word
1. Let's change the picture again. Get a picture of rain in your 
head. Do you have it? a) What will make you wet? Will the picture of 
rain in your head make you wet or will the word 'rain' make you wet?
b) Will the picture of rain in your head make you wet?
2. Now get a picture of a penny in your head. Do you have it?
a) What can you buy bubble gum with, the picture of a penny in your head
or with the word 'penny'? b) Can you buy bubble gum with the picture of
the penny in your head?
Scoring Procedure for B and B'
Each correct answer received one point and the total was obtained.




(Comparable to Metalinguistic Knowledge Summary Score.)
D. Metaknowledge Summary Score
The proportion of correct responses on all metalinguistic and 
elicit knowledge of imagery tasks of the total number of responses was 
obtained and used in further analyses.
4. Test of Hierarchic Semantic Organization
(Adapted from Steinberg & Anderson, 1975)
Stimuli. There were eight 5 x 5  black and white line drawings which 
depicted the target nouns listed in Appendix B. Four of these were also 
high imagery noun word association stimuli. There were also two distrac- 
tors (bird and book) and two practice items (pencil and house). These 
drawings were compiled in an eight page booklet, one drawing per page.
Figure 1 presents the hierarchic semantic relationships among the 
various types of words used as retrieval cues. There were four different 
randomizations of retrieval cues to which Ss were randomly assigned. It 
was predicted that the probability of recalling the target noun as a 
function of administration of the various retrieval cues differs depending 
on how many notches away the retrieval cue is from the target noun. For 
example, hhe probability of retrieving the target noun given the close 
superordinate as the retrieval cue is greater than if the close cohyponya 
is the retrieval cue. The five comparisons that were tested for each 
subject are given below, where the term P(N/CC), for example, is read as 
the probability of naming (N) the target noun, given the clase cohyponym 
as the retrieval cue. In every case the first probability is predicted 






5. £P(N/RS)- P(N/RC)7, ^(N/CS - P(N/CC)7
Remote Superordinate 
\(e.g., something that takes you 
X. someplace)
Close Superordinate
(e.g., something that's, 
goes on the road)
Close Cohyponym Remote CohyponymTarget Noun
(e.g., car) (e.g., bus) (e.g., airplane)
Fig. 1. Relationships among words in a class inclusion tree.
Procedure.. The subject was told, "We are going to play a picture 
remembering game. First we will look at the pictures in my book. Then, I 
will close the book and tell you some words. You tell me which picture the 
word makes you think of. Let's try some and see how it goes."
After asking the S to name each of the practice pictures on the first 
two pages, the E said, "Which picture did you see that makes you think of
a _____ ?" where the blank is one of the five practice retrieval cues. The
E corrected the S's misunderstandings or praised her for knowing the rules 
6f the game. When the E was sure the procedure was understood, the S was 
directed to turn the pages and mame each of the drawings in the set at her 
own rate. Then the E closed the book and read each cue. The S named the
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picture she was most reminded of or indicated that she could not remember 
any.
Scoring Procedure. Responses were counted as correct if and only if 
they matched the targmt noun in the same category as the cue. The propor­
tions of target pictures recalled were calculated for each S as a function 
of the type of retrieval cue administered. The performance of each S 
was also examined to determine if it confirmed or infirmed the five pre­
dictions of relative ease of recall of targets as a function of retrieval 
cue (see stimuli for a complete list of predictions), and the total number 
of confirmations and infirmations were obtained for each age group.
5. Word-Word Relationship Task
Stimuli. There were four noun, four verb and four adjective paradig­
matic word pairs. Within each grammatical class, superordinate, logical 
coordinate, contrast and synonym relationship types were exemplified by 
one pair. One word of each pair was a word association stimulus item. 
(See Appendix C for complete stimulus list.)
Procedure (Adapted from Lippman, 1971). The E said, "Now we're going 
to read two words out loud to you and I would like you to tell me why 
these two words might go together. If you don't think the words go 
together at all, you can say so." As each word pair is read, the child 
is asked in sequence, "Can you think of any reason why these two words 
might go together? Is there anything that these two words both are?
How are they alike or different? Can you think of any other reason why
  and _____  might go together?" There were four different constant
random orders of problems, of which one was presented to each subject.
The order of mention of the two items in each pair was counterbalanced.
70
Scoring Procedure.(Adapted from Lippman. 1971). The children's 
reasons for why the two words 'go together' were scored as follows:
1. Contrast - Child states that the two Items are opposite In
meaning.
2. Hierarchical - Child states that the two Items are In a super­
ordinate-subordinate relationship (e.g., a dress is one type of 
clothing; red is one kind of color).
3. Synonym - Child claims that both items mean the same thing or 
refer to the same object.
4. Coordinate - Child refers to a category which both items belong 
to (e.g., they're both food, fruit, actions, colors).
5. Functional Equivalence - Both items are related to an action (e.g.,
you can do both of them while you're playing; you can eat both
of them), without reference to the category which both items 
belong to.
6. Perceptual - Items are related to one another through a common 
sensory attribute (e.g., look alike, taste alike).
7. Examples - No mention is made of a common category and both items 
are simply mentioned as modifying the same object (e.g., red 
paper-green paper).
8. Comparative - The two items are directly compared (e.g., for 
rich-poor, one's better than the other).
9. Fiat - No attempt at a coherent reason is made (e.g., one's rich, 
the other's poor).
10. Other - An entirely irrelevant response is given (e.g., stop-go).
11. No response
12. Discordance - The two items are said not to go together at all 
because of their difference or some incompatibility due to some
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difference In a perceptual attribute or because they are opposites.
Summary Score. The proportion of the total (12) correct logical 
justifications (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and A) and discordance justifications, In 
which the child Indicates the two words are opposites, was calculated for 
each subject and used in further analyses.
CHAPTER V - RESULTS
Interrater Reliability
The interrater reliability varied from .94 for the word associ­
ation responses to .98 for the metaknowledge tasks.
General Method
First it was important to determine whether the various word
association tests and imagery values elicited different proportions of
the various response types. To accomplish this, 5 way (2-condition x
3-grade x 5-test x 2-imagery x 3-part of speech) repeated measures
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analyses of variance were performed on the proportions of the response 
types descrihed in the previous chapter (i.e., paradigmatic, syntagmatic, 
miscellaneous, and logical responses, which were a subset of paradig­
matic responses) given for each test, in response to high and low 
imagery words.
In cases where the test main effect was significant, test treatment
means (i.e., the paradigmatic, syntagmatic, imagery and time delay test
means) were compared to that of the first free word association test
13
using Dunnett's tests, which are appropriate to compare treatment means 
to a control group (Winer, 1971). In this case the control or 
standard was the first word association test against which all other 
tests were compared to assess the effects of special instructions. All 
other main effects (i.e., imagery, speech, grade) and other comparisons 
among the tests themselves were invest!-
12
All analyses of word association data were rerun on raw scores 
with equivalent results.
13Although the groups were not independent, Dunnett's tests are a 
conservative indication of significant differences between "treatment" 
and control groups (Weinstock, personal communication).
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gated using Duncan's procedure, a more conservative post hoc test 
(Winer, 1971). These post hoc analyses were performed both on the 
proportions of each response type for each test and on the change 
scores.
Effect of Condition
Four separate five way (2-condition X 3-grade X 5-test X 2- 
imagery X 3-part of speech) analyses of variance were performed, one 
each on the proportions of paradigmatic, syntagmatic,miscellaneous 
and logical responses. There were no significant effects for condi­
tion for any of the response types. Unless otherwise specified, all 
findings are derived from these analyses.
Effect of Time Delay Test
The five way (2-condition X 3-grade X 5-test X 2-imagery X 3-part 
of speech) repeated measures analyses of variance performed on the 
latencies of response for all response types combined showed that the 
latencies of the imagery (X = 4.22), the syntagmatic (X = 4.25), and 
the time delay (X = 4.117) tests did not differ significantly from one 
another, although these three were significantly slower than either 
the paradigmatic (X = 3.529) or the first word (X = 2.952) tests 
(p<.01). Yet the time delay condition did not differ from the first 
word tests on proportions of any of the response types. Hence, any 
differences in proportions of response types among the first word, 
paradigmatic, syntagmatic and imagery tests cannot be attributed 
merely to differences in latency of response. Time delay alone does 
not influence word association responding.
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Effect of Test Instruction on Response Type
There were significant test main effects for the paradigmatic 
(F = 62.688; df = 4,188; p^.001), syntagmatic (F = 52.474; df = 4,188; 
p<.001) and logical (£ = 50.161; df = 4,188; p^.001) responses but 
not for the miscellaneous responses (see Table 2 for mean proportions). 
The various test instructions appropriately changed S's level of 
responding as follows:
(a) Paradigmatic Responses. The paradigmatic test elicited 
significantly more paradigmatic responses than any other test, 
followed by the first word test and then by the imagery and syntagmatic 
tests. All test mean proportions differed significantly from one 
another (p<.01). As a subset of paradigmatic responses, logical 
responses followed exactly the same pattern as paradigmatic responses.
The grade X test interaction (£ = 8.075; df = 8,188; p<.001) 
indicated that the kindergarteners' level of responding remained much 
more even throughout the different tests than did older subjects (see 
Table 3 for mean proportions), suggesting that kindergarteners were 
less able to comply with test instructions than the older groups.
(b) Syntagmatic Responses. The imagery test was successful in 
eliciting more syntagmatic responses than the first word test (p^.01) 
but the syntagmatic test was even more successful than the imagery 
test in increasing syntagmatic responding. These were followed by 
the first word and finally the paradigmatic tests, which elicited 
fewest syntagmatic responses. All test mean proportions were signif­
icantly different from one another. These findings suggest that a 
deliberate verbal strategy to generate sentence fragments is more 
successful in generating syntagmatic responses than is a strategy to
TABLE 2
Mean Proportions of Response Types as a Percentage of Total







Syntagmatic Imagery Time Delay
All Responses 
Combined
Paradigmatic* .606 .715 .208 .413 .588 .506
Syntagmatic* .294 .165 .678 .434 .316 .377
Miscellaneous .100 .120 .114 .153 .096 .127
* Significant test main effect at .001 level.
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TABLE 3
Mean Proportions of Response Types as a




Type Kindergarten Second College
Paradigmatic .549 .608 .662
Syntagmatic .210 .354 .317
Miscellaneous .241 .038 .021
Paradigmatic Test
Paradigmatic .525 .709 .913
Syntagmatic .215 .201 .078
Miscellaneous .260 . 09 .009
Syntagmatic Test
Paradigmatic .361 .134 .130
Syntagmatic .385 .782 .868
Miscellaneous .254 .084 .012
Imagery Test
Paradigmatic .476 .392 .371
Syntagmatic .306 .431 .566
Miscellaneous .218 .177 .063
Time Delay Test
Paradigmatic .521 .629 .614
Syntagmatic .254 .326 .368
Miscellaneous .225 .045 .033
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produce stimulus-evoked images.
The grade X test interaction for syntagmatic responses (F = 6.684; 
df = 8,188; p <  .001) showed that all the second graders and college 
students increased their level of syntagmatic responding in the 
syntagmatic and imagery tests much more than did the kindergarteners 
(see Table 3 for mean proportions). This suggests that kindergarteners 
were much less able to follow the imagery and other instructions than 
older subjects.
Changes With Age Over All Tests
The five way (2-condition X 3-grade X 5-test X 2-imagery X 3- 
part of speech) analysis of variance performed on responses of all 
five tests showed a significant grade main effect for syntagmatic 
(f = 5.745; df = 2,47; p<.006) and miscellaneous (F = 9.133; 
df = 2,47; p ̂ .001) responses but not for paradigmatic or logical 
responses. (See Table 4 for mean proportions.) Second graders and 
college students made significantly more syntagmatic responses than 
kindergarteners over all tests (p<.01). Kindergarteners made more 
miscellaneous responses than college students or second graders, who 
did not differ significantly from one another (p< .01). Hence it 
appears that kindergarteners made fewer syntagmatic but more miscel­
laneous responses than older subjects, while levels of paradigmatic 
responding over all the tests were comparable for all age Ss.
Changes With Age in the First Word Association Test Only:
Evidence Relating to the Syntagmatic-Paradigmatic Shift
The proportion of paradigmatic and syntagmatic responses for the 
first word association test only were submitted to a three way (3-grade
TABLE 4






Paradigmatic .486 .494 .538
Syntagmatic* .274 .419 .439
Miscellaneous* .240 .087 .023
* Significant Grade Main Effect
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X 2-imagery X 3-part of speech) repeated measures analysis of variance. 
There were no significant grade main effects for either paradigmatic 
or syntagmatic responses. All grades made an equivalent number of 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic responses, contrary to the expectation 
that syntagmatic responding decreases while paradigmatic responding 
increases with age. (See Table 3 for mean proportions.)
In order to compare the proportions of paradigmatic and syntag­
matic responses made, a four way repeated measures analysis of 
variance (3-grade X 2-response type X 2-imagery X 3-part of speech) 
was also performed for the first word test only. There was a signifi­
cant main effect for response type (F = 13.196; df = 1,47; p^.OOl).
All grades made more paradigmatic responses (X = .606) than syntagmatic 
(X = .294) (p <  .01) .
Negation Responses Eliminated from Paradigmatic Responses
Many kindergarteners stereotypically provided paradigmatic 
"negation" responses, while very few of the second graders and vir­
tually none of the college students did so. To determine whether the 
lack of a grade effect for paradigmatic responses might be accounted 
for solely by the preponderance of negation responses by kindergarten­
ers, the proportions of negation responses were subtracted from the 
corresponding proportions of paradigmatic responses for all the tests.
A five way (2-condition X 3-grade X 5-test X 2-imagery X 3-part of 
speech) repeated measures analysis of variance was performed on the 
remainder of paradigmatic responses.
This analysis showed a significant grade main effect (F = 15.644; 
df = 2,47; p<&.001). Kindergarteners (X = .266) produced fewer
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paradigmatic responses than second graders (X = .422) and college 
students (X = .521) who did not differ significantly from one another 
(p C.01).
A three way (grade X 2-imagery X 3-part of speech) repeated 
measure analysis of variance was performed on the remainder of para­
digmatic responses for the first word association test only. Here too 
there was a significant grade effect (F = 19.01; df = 2,47; p^.001). 
Kindergarteners (X = .251) made fewer paradigmatic responses than 
second graders (X = .521) or college students (X = .656) (p< .01) who 
did not significantly differ from one another.
In sum, when negation responses were excluded from the paradig­
matic category, a shift with age from lower to higher levels of para­
digmatic respondingwas shown.
Imagery Value and Syntagmatic Responses
High imagery words (X = .419) produced more syntagmatic responses 
than low imagery words (X = .336) across all tests as revealed by the 
significant main effect for imagery (F = 23.65; df = 1,47; p<.001). 
This provides support for the hypothesis linking syntagmatic responses 
and imagery.
The significant test X imagery interaction (F = 5.294; df = 4,188; 
p^.OOl) also showed that the differential elicitation of syntagmatic 
responses by high and low imagery words was most pronounced in the 
imagery condition, and then in the FW condition. In the paradigmatic 
and syntagmatic tests, both high and low imagery words elicited almost 
the same number of syntagmatic responses (see Table 5 for mean pro­
portions) . This indicates that stimulus imagery value has its 
greatest effect when it is not superseded by deliberate verbal
TABLE 5
Mean Proportion of Syntagmatic Responses as a Percentage of 
Total Responses for High and Low Imagery Value Words By Type
of Test
TESTS
Imagery First Time All Tests
Value Word Paradigmatic Syntagmatic Imagery Delay Combined
High .340 .182 .698 .527 .350 .419
Low .247 .148 .659 .341 .282 .336
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strategies used in the paradigmatic and syntagmatic tests.
There was also a significant grade X imagery interaction for 
syntagmatic responses (F, = 3.961; df = 2,47; p = .026) which showed 
that the high imagery words elicited many more syntagmatic responses 
for second graders and college students but that kindergarteners did 
not differentially respond to the imagery value of the words. (See 
Table 6 for mean proportions.)
Imagery Value and Other Response Types
There was a significant main effect for imagery value for mis­
cellaneous responses (F = 48.162; df = 1,47; p^.001). Low imagery 
words (X = .185) elicited significantly more miscellaneous responses 
than high imagery words (X = .113). Thus, subjects did not respond at 
all when given a low imagery word as a stimulus.
There was no significant main effect for imagery for paradigmatic 
or logical responses whether or not negation responses were categor­
ized as paradigmatic. Contrary to prediction, low imagery words did 
not produce significantly more logical responses than high imagery 
words in any of the tests. Hence, the data did not support the hypo­
thesis that responses to low imagery stimuli would be more often 
mediated by hierarchic semantic organization and be correlated with 
logical paradigmatic associations.
Response Latencies; Across All Responses
A five way (2-condition X 3-grade X 5-test X 2-imagery X 3-part 
of speech) analysis of variance was performed on the mean latency of 
response across all responses. It showed that high imagery words 
(X = 3.6) elicited responses more quickly than low imagery words
TABLE 6
Mean Proportions of Syntagmatic Responses as a Percentage 
of Total Responses for High and Low Imagery Words 




High .285 . 465 .509
Low .264 .373 .370
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(X = 4.25) F = 37.223; df = 1,47; p<001).
The significant test effect (F = 12.014; df = 4,188; p<.001) 
showed that responses In the first word test (X = 2.95 ) were signifi­
cantly quicker than in the paradigmatic test (X = 3.52 ) (p<.01), 
which in turn was faster than the syntagmatic (X * 4.25), imagery 
(X = 4.22) and time delay (X = 4.11 ) tests (p<.01), the three of 
which did not differ significantly from one another.
There was a significant grade effect for the mean latencies of 
all responses combined (F = 6.169; df = 2,47; p<.005). College 
students and kindergarteners on the one hand, and kindergarteners and 
second graders on the other, did not differ from one another. But 
college students responded significantly more quickly than the second 
graders (p<.01). The significant grade X test interaction (F = 3.415; 
df = 8,188; p<.002), however, showed that college students were 
quicker than both the younger groups in the first word test, and that 
in the time delay test all groups responded at the same speed. In the 
paradigmatic, imagery and especially the syntagmatic tests, however, 
second graders were much more slow to respond than either kindergarteners 
or college students, who responded equally quickly. (See Table 7 for 
mean latencies.)
Response Latencies of Imagery and Linguistically Mediated Associations
It was hypothesized that imagery mediated response (i.e., syntag­
matic responses in the first word and imagery test) would be produced 
more slowly than linguistically mediated responses (i.e., syntagmatic 
responses in the syntagmatic test and logical paradigmatic responses).
To test this hypothesis a five way (3-grade X 2-response type X 5-test 
X 2-imagery X 3-part of speech) repeated measures analysis of variance
TABLE 7 -
Mean Latencies of Response in Seconds Across All Response Types for Each
Grade and Test and for all Tests Conibined
TESTS
All Tests
Grade First Word Paradigmatic Syntagmatic Imagery Time Delay Combined
Kindergarten 3.41 3.17 4.03 4.22 4.27 3.82
Second 3.37 4.28 5.63 4.94 4.08 4.46
College 2.06 3.12 3.07 3.48 3.99 3.18
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was performed on the mean response latencies of logical paradigmatic 
and syntagmatic associations. The significant main effect for response 
type (F = 13.562; df = 1,47; p^.Ol) showed that logical paradigmatic 
responses (X = 3.74) were faster than syntagmatic responses (X = 4.49).
The latter responses in fact were slower than any of the paradigmatic 
responses in any of the tests (see Table 8 for all the means). Further, 
latencies of syntagmatic associations in the imagery test (X = 4.57) 
did not differ significantly from those in the syntagmatic test 
(X = 4.49).
Hence, the hypothesis that imagery mediated responses would 
have longer latencies than linguistically mediated ones was infirmed.
Rather, all syntagmatic responses (X = 4.49 ), including those in the 
syntagmatic test, were significantly slower than all paradigmatic 
responses (X = 3.74 ).
Cognitive Variables and Word Association
There were several hypotheses relating to the cognitive variables 
[i.e., knowledge of word-word relationships, metaknowledge of lan­
guage and images, Steinberg and Anderson's (1975) hierarchic semantic 
organization and ability to recognize one's own paradigmatic response 
pattern (articulation)] to word association responding. Pearson 
product-moment correlations were computed for each of the proportions 
of correct answers on the cognitive tasks and age. All but two 
intercorrelations between the cognitive tasks and articulation reached 
significance (see Table 9). This suggests that these scores are valid 
indications of some aspect of cognition. (See Table 9a for mean scores by grade.)
Hierarchic Semantic Organization (Abbreviated HSO). As previously
TABLE 8
Mean Latencies of Response in Seconds of Logical Paradigmatic
and Syntagmatic Associations for Each Test Across all Grades








Paradigmatic 2.65 3.48 4.42 4.05 4.10 3.84
Syntagmatic 3.53 4.01 4.49 4.57 4.29 4.49
TABLE 9











Relationships .690*** .494** 1
Age .616*** .540** .775*** 1
Articulation .256 .313 -.397* .333 1.
*Significance at least at the .05 level.
**Significance at least at the .01 level.
***Significance at least at the .001 level.
88
a TABLE 9a
















Grade X~ SD X SD X SD X SD X SD
Kindergarten .770 .267 .81 .218 .83 .134 .378 .273 .685 .2
(10.02) (3.471)** (9.72) (2.616) (20.75) (3.35) (4.536) (3.276) (13.7) (4.)
Second .98 .042 .89 .129 .93 .082 .59 .208 .875 .089
(12.74) (.546) (10.68) (1.548) (23.25) (2.05) (7.08) (2.496) (17.5) (1.78)
College 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
(13) (0) (12) (0) (25) (0) (12) (0) (20) (0)
* Numbers in parentheses refer to the total number of possible correct responses.
** Numbers in parentheses refer to the mean raw scores. Other numbers are mean proportions of correct 
responses.
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described, Steinberg & Anderson (1975) tested and confirmed predic­
tions concerning the probability of recalling target nouns given 
various retrieval cues. (See section in Method on HSO for elabora­
tion.) The present results also confirmed those predictions (see 
Table 10 for predictions and results) for both second graders and 
kindergarteners, indicating that these two groups have comparable 
hierarchic semantic organizations. However, a one way (3-grade) 
analysis of variance performed on the total number of correct 
responses showed a significant main effect for grade (F = 15.742; 
df = 2,27; p<.001). Further, post hoc tests showed that all the 
grades differed significantly from one another (p^.05). Thus, while 
all grades had similar hierarchic semantic structures, there was a 
quantitative difference in the degree to which the structure was 
present.
Difference Scores; Their Limitations and a Solution
To evaluate the hypotheses it was necessary to assess whether 
subjects of different ages and cognitive levels differentially 
changed their level of responding to accord with various word 
association instructions. To do this, difference scores were obtained 
by subtracting each subject’s proportion of responses for a partic­
ular response type on each of the four special instruction tests 
(i.e., paradigmatic, syntagmatic, imagery and time delay) from the
1 4corresponding proportion given on the first word association test.
For example, there were four difference scores for each subject for 
the proportion of paradigmatic responses elicited by high imagery
^  All analyses of word association data were rerun on raw 
scores with equivalent results.
TABLE 10





K 2 K 2
Infirm 
K 2
p( N/C9,p(N/RS) 2 6 7 3 1 1
P(N/CS),P(N/CC) 4 7 6 1 0 2
P(H/RS),P(N/RC) 7 8 3 2 0 0
P(N/CC),P(N/RC) 8 7 2 3 0 0
[p (n /r s )-p (n /r c)]
[P(N/CS)-P(N/CC)]
8 5 2 4 0 1
Total 29 33 20 13 1 4
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nouns, high imagery verbs and so on. Repeated measures analyses of 
variance and covariance were then performed on these scores.
These difference scores were misleading, however, as they only 
measured absolute amount of change and did not take the starting 
point, the level of responding on the first word test, into account, 
and thereby concealed ceiling effects. For example, a subject who 
responded with many paradigmatic responses in the first word test 
and then equally as many appropriate paradigmatic responses in the 
paradigmatic test did not change her response pattern. On the other 
hand, a subject who had a low level of paradigmatic responding in the 
first word test and many appropriate responses in the paradigmatic 
test did change. But both subjects may have equally as many of the 
appropriate paradigmatic responses in the paradigmatic test. Thus, 
since difference scores did not take the starting point on the first 
word test into account, they did not truly reflect the differences in 
response patterns among the grades.
Indeed, when four way (3-grade X 5-test X 2-imagery X 3-part of 
speech) analyses of variance were performed on the difference scores, 
there were no significant grade effects for any of the response types. 
The grades did not differ significantly from one another in the 
absolute amount of change in level of responding from the first word 
to the special instruction tests for any of the response types. Yet 
the significant grade by test interactions discussed earlier showed 
that the different grades did differ in the extent to which they 
changed their level of responding over the various tests. Absolute 
amount of change in responding^which difference scores measured^was 
not indicative of the differential success with which the grades
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complied with the instructions.
In still other analyses of variance the subjects were divided 
into two groups on the basis of the median split of the proportion of 
correct hierarchic semantic organization responses. Hierarchic 
semantic organization then acted as the independent grouping variable 
in four way (2-hierarchic semantic organization X 5-test X 2-imagery 
X 3-part of speech) repeated measures analyses of variance performed 
on the difference scores of the various response types. Here too 
there was no significant main effect for hierarchic semantic organi­
zation for any of the response types.
The median splits of the word-word relationship and the meta­
knowledge scores were also used as the independent grouping variables 
in three way (2-metaknowledge X 2-word-word X 5-test) repeated 
measure analyses of variance performed on the difference scores for 
each of the three response types. Again there was no significant 
main effect for either metaknowledge or word-word relationship scores 
on any of the response types. Hence, in order to attempt to 
determine whether the cognitive variables played a role in changes 
in word association responding another kind of analysis of covariance 
was designed to account for the level of responding in the first 
word test.
In these analyses the independent variables were the proportions 
of the appropriate responses on the paradigmatic, syntagmatic and 
imagery tests respectively. The covariates were the corresponding 
proportions of responses on the first word test. In an additional 
set of ANCOVAS, age was the second covariate. To illustrate, in the 
paradigmatic test the subjects were divided into three groups, low,
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medium and high, on the basis of a trichotomy of the number of the
paradigmatic responses they gave. The number of paradigmatic
responses on the first word test acted as the covariate in order to
control for the starting point from which change in paradigmatic
responding was to be measured. In the syntagmatic and imagery tests
the Ss were similarly divided into three groups on the basis of a
trichotomy of the number of syntagmatic responses given in each of
them. The number of syntagmatic responses on the first word test was
the covariate in both cases. In all of these one way analyses of
covariance (3-response type levels) the subjects' scores on: (a)
metalinguistic knowledge, (b) explicit knowledge of imagery, (c) metaknowledge
summary score, (d) hierarchic semantic organization, (e) word-word
relationships and (f) articulation of response pattern, were the
dependent variables. It was then possible to determine whether those
who responded with a high, medium or low proportion of appropriate
associations on the special instruction tests differed in their
scores on metaknowledge, word-word, hierarchic semantic organization
or ability to recognize their response pattern.
Metaknowledge and Change in Responding 
to Accord with Test Instructions
In the analyses of covariance described above, there were no 
significant effects for either the metaknowledge summary score, or its 
components; metalinguistic knowledge and explicit knowledge of 
imagery. High, medium and low responders of paradigmatic and syntag­
matic associations did not differ significantly in terms of metaknow­
ledge scores. (See Table 11 for F tests.)
TABLE 11
F Tests for Main Effects for Cognitive Variables with Response 
Level on the First Word Association Test as the Only Covariate
Trichotomy for Paradigmatic Responding in 
the Paradigmatic Test
Cognitive Variable F df P
Hierarchic Semantic 3.831 2,26 .035
MetaKnowledge 2.660 2,26 .089
Word-Word 3.729 2,26 .038
Articulation 4.186 2,26 .622






MetaKnowledge 1.193 2,26 .32
Word-Word 6.889 2,26 .004
Articulation 2.312 2y 26 .111




MetaKnowledge .085 2,26 .5
Word-Word 4.782 2,26 .01
Articulation 3.105 2,26 .055
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Word-Word Relationship Scores and Change in 
Responding to Accord with Test Instructions
For all the changes in responding, the low, medium and high 
groups differed in terms of their knowledge of word-word relationship 
when level of responding on the first test acted as the only covariate. 
Ss who responded with the highest proportion of appropriate responses 
also had higher word-word scores than those who responded with fewer 
appropriate responses (see Table 11 for F tests). When age acted as 
the second covariate, however, only low (X = .410), medium (X = .810) 
and high (X = .67) paradigmatic responders on the paradigmatic test 
differed in terms of word-word scores (F = 3.499; df = 2.25; p<.046). 
Thus, both explicit knowledge of hierarchic semantic relationships and 
age were equally good predictors of the ability to change to syntagmatic 
responses to accord with task demands. But explicit knowledge of 
hierarchic semantic organization was a better predictor of ability to 
change to paradigmatic responding than age.
Explicit and Implicit Knowledge of Semantic Organization 
and Paradigmatic Responding in the First Word Test
In order to determine whether explicit knowledge of word-word 
relationships was correlated with paradigmatic responding in the first 
word test, subjects were divided into three groups, low, medium and 
high, on the basis of a trichotomy of the number of paradigmatic 
responses given in the first word test (abbreviated PRF). One way 
(3-PRF level) analyses of variance and covariance with age as the 
covariate were performed on word-word and hierarchic semantic organi­
zation scores. The analysis of variance Q? = 5.078; df = 2,27; 
p = .015) showed that high (X = .633) and medium (X = .81) paradigmatic
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paradigmatic responders indeed had higher word-word scores than those 
who were low (X = .378) paradigmatic responders (p<.01). But when 
the effect of age was controlled, high, medium and low paradigmatic 
responders no longer differed significantly in their word-word scores 
(F = 2.897; df = 2,24; p = .075). Yet the level of paradigmatic 
responding was significant in both the analyses of variance (F = 8.669; 
df = 2,25; p = .002) and covariance (F = 5.907; df = 2,24; p = .009), f°r 
hierarchic semantic organization, presumed to be a measure of implicit 
knowledge of word-word relationships. High (X = .883) and medium 
(X = .955) paradigmatic responders scored higher on hierarchic semantic 
organization than low responders (X = .683) even when age effects 
were controlled. Contrary to prediction, low, medium and high para­
digmatic responders on the first word test differed in terms of 
implicit, rather than explicit hierarchic semantic knowledge, even 
when the effect of age was controlled.
Ability to Recognize One's Own Paradigmatic Response Pattern and Fre­
quency of Paradigmatic Responding in the First Word Association Test 
A one way (3-grade) analysis of variance on pass/fail scores on 
the ability to recognize one's own paradigmatic response pattern in 
the first word association test showed a significant main effect for 
grade (J = 4.119; df = 2,47; p = .023). In a code in which "1" 
indicates a pass and "2" indicates a failure, kindergarteners (X = 1.55) 
were better able to recognize their paradigmatic responses than second 
graders (X = 1.75) or college students (X = 2.0) (p^!05). Kinder­
garteners were able to say they had said the opposite or had affixed 
"not" or "un" to all stimulus words for their responses and in fact 
said they had deliberately tried to do so. Older Ss were not aware
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that they had responded in any special way and had not consciously 
tried to produce certain kinds of associations. This infirms the 
prediction that young children who respond paradigmatically will not 
be able to articulate that they are doing so.
There was no significant correlation between articulation and 
metaknowledge, also contrary to prediction. Kindergarten children 
were able to report that they had deliberately monitored their word 
association responding to produce negated paradigmatic responses 
without having higher levels of metaknowledge. (See Table 9 for 
correlations.)
Negation Responses Eliminated from Paradigmatic 
Responses in the First Word and Paradigmatic Test
To determine whether different cognitive variables influenced 
the production of the remainder of paradigmatic responses after 
negation responses were removed from the total, subjects were divided 
into three groups, low, medium and high, on the basis of a trichotomy 
of the remainder of paradigmatic responses given in the first word 
test (abbreviated PRng). One way (3-PRng) analyses of variance and 
covariance, with age as the covariate, were performed on the proportion 
of correct (a) metalinguistic knowledge responses, (b) explicit 
knowledge of imagery responses, (c) the metaknowledge summary score,
(d) implicit and (e) explicit hierarchic semantic organization scores 
and (f) articulation of response pattern scores. As in the correspond­
ing analyses of paradigmatic responses including negation associations, 
low (X = .69), medium (X = .94) and high (X = .93) paradigmatic 
responders differed significantly in terms of their implicit knowledge 
of hierarchic semantic organization (F = 6.177; df = 2,26; p = .007)
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even when age was controlled. But in contrast to the analysis of the 
total, three levels of responders also differed in terms of metalin­
guistic knowledge (low X = .78; medium X = .98; high X = .99) (F = 3.681; 
df = 2,26; p = .04) and explicit knowledge of hierarchic semantic 
organization (low X = .33; medium X = .76; low X = .8) (F = 6.303; 
df = 2,26; p = .006) even when age was controlled. All other findings 
were non-significant, as in the analyses for the total number of para­
digmatic responses.
Paradigmatic responses in the paradigmatic test were also 
analyzed with negation responses eliminated from the analyses. These 
analyses of variance and covariance corresponded to those performed 
on paradigmatic associations including negation responses. Results 
showed no differences between the two sets of analyses in the 
influence of cognitive variables upon paradigmatic responding in the 
paradigmatic test.
Summary of Results
(1) Test instructions appropriately modified paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic responding. Miscellaneous responding remained the same 
over the tests. Kindergarteners appropriately modified their level 
of responding to a lesser extent than the older groups.
(2) When negation responses were Categorized as paradigmatic 
responses, all grades made the same number of paradigmatic responses 
over all tests and in the first word test only. When negation 
responses were not categorized as paradigmatic, second graders and 
college students made more paradigmatic responses than kindergarteners. 
There was also an increase in syntagmatic responding with age over all
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tests. When only the first word test was considered, there was no 
developmental change in syntagmatic responding. Miscellaneous 
responding decreased with age over all tests and in the first word 
test alone.
(3) High imagery words produced more syntagmatic responses than 
low imagery words over all tests, but this was especially apparent in 
the imagery and first word tests; it was also true in second graders 
and college students. Kindergarteners did not differentially respond 
to the imagery value of words. While high imagery words eliciteĉ more 
syntagmatic responses than low imagery words in the first word test 
alone, the difference wasnot significant.
(4) Low imagery words producedmore miscellaneous responses than 
high imagery words.
(5) Low and high imagery words did not differentially elicit 
logical paradigmatic responses.
(6) Response latencies in the first word test and for high 
imagery words were shorter than those for any other test and low 
imagery words respectively. Second graders responded more slowly 
than college students and kindergarteners in the special instruction 
tests, but college students responded more quickly than the two 
younger groups in the first word test. All syntagmatic responses, 
including those in the syntagmatic test, had longer latencies than 
all logical paradigmatic responses.
(7) The present findings replicated those of Steinberg & Anderson 
(1975) with respect to relative probabilities of correct responses to 
various retrieval cues, indicating that kindergarten and second-grade 
children had similar implicit semantic structures. But the structure
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was more completely filled in for second graders than for kindergar­
teners.
(8) Implicit, rather than explicit knowledge of hierarchic 
semantic organization, was related to higher levels of paradigmatic 
responding in the first word test when negation responses were 
categorized as paradigmatic. When negation responses were not so 
categorized, explicit, as well as implicit knowledge of hierarchic 
semantic organization, and metalinguistic knowledge, were related to 
higher levels of paradigmatic responding in the first word test. But 
explicit knowledge of word-word relationships was related to the 
ability to increase paradigmatic responding willfully, whether or not 
negation responses were categorized as paradigmatic.
(9) Implicit knowledge of hierarchic semantic organization was
no better a predictor than age of ability to change paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic responding in the paradigmatic, syntagmatic and imagery 
tests, whether or not negation responses were
categorized as paradigmatic. But explicit knowledge of word-word 
relationships was more important than age in determining paradigmatic 
responding in the paradigmatic test. This effect occurred whether or 
not negation responses were categorized as paradigmatic but did not 
extend to syntagmatic response changes in the syntagmatic or imagery 
tests.
(10) Contrary to expectation, neither metaknowledge nor either of 
its components (i.e., metalinguistic knowledge and explicit knowledge 
of imagery) was related to amount of change in syntagmatic and para­
digmatic responding (whether or not negation responses were categorized 
as paradigmatic) in the syntagmatic, imagery and paradigmatic tests.
The ability to understand that words and images are entities distinct
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from their referents does not seem important in determining the 
voluntary manipulation of these cognitive entities in this context.
In the first word test alone, however, metalinguistic knowledge 
was a concomitant of high levels of paradigmatic responding when 
negation responses were not categorized as paradigmatic, even when 
the effect of age was controlled. When negation responses were 
categorized as paradigmatic, no effect of metaknowledge or either of 
its components was found.
(11) Kindergarteners were better able to recognize their para­
digmatic (negation) responses than second graders or college students. 
This ability was not accompanied by higher levels of metaknowledge.
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CHAPTER VI - DISCUSSION
Several hypotheses were advanced to account for the syntagmatic- 
paradigmatic word association shift. The central hypothesis was that 
the syntagmatic responses of young children are mediated by stimulus 
evoked images. Syntagmatic associations are later superseded by para­
digmatic responses, mediated by hierarchic semantic organization structure. 
This structure was hypothesized to be present even in young syntagmatic 
responders, who do not use it to mediate associations mainly because they 
do not know they are supposed to. With exposure to a formal educational 
system, however, they explicitly learn hierarchic relationships among 
words and that paradigmatic responses, especially logical ones, are more 
valued by their culture. They then automatically exploit their 
hierarchic semantic structure for that purpose. But young paradigmatic 
responders are unable to willfully and consciously change their word 
association response patterns at first. It is only with the acquisition 
of metaknowledge, as well as explicit category knowledge that they can 
consciously change their word association responding to accord with 
task demands.
Before discussing these hypotheses, it is important to examine the 
similarity of the present study's findings and other studies of the 
syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift. The most glaring difference is that this 
study failed to find a developmental shift from syntagmatic to paradig­
matic responding. On the first word test alone, miscellaneous responding 
decreased with age, a finding like Entwisle's (1966). Level of syntag­
matic responding, however, did not decrease or, as Entwisle found, 
increase with age. But most importantly, Ss of all grades responded
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with high levels of paradigmatic associations which did not differ 
statistically from one another, when negation responses were categorized 
as paradigmatic. When such responses were excluded from the paradigmatic 
category, a shift with age to paradigmatic responding was shown. Other 
investigators (e.g. Entwisle, 1966) also have considered negation responses 
to be paradigmatic, but nonetheless found developmental shifts in paradig­
matic responding. The inability to find one in the present study when 
negations were categorized as paradigmatic may be due to the fact that 
more kindergarteners stereotypically produced them in this study than in 
others. This in turn may be explained by the fact that the kindergarten­
ers in this study were gifted, selected for attendance at their school 
on the basis of an intelligence test and an interview, and had acquired 
the concept of "opposite" in the classroom. In fact, their teacher was 
drilling them on this concept during the period that they were acting as 
experimental subjects. Their classroom training simply may have transferred to 
the word association test situation. Hence, it is probably not mis­
representing matters to discount these responses as paradigmatic, especially 
since many of the associations (e.g. "unidea") are not acceptable words in 
English. Rather, they, like clang (rhyming) associations, are stereo­
typed responses, which the child can produce without even considering the 
stimulus meaning.
Imagery and Syntagmatic Responding
The central hypothesis concerning the relationship between 
stimulus-evoked imagery and syntagmatic responses was supported by three 
findings. First, high imagery words elicited significantly more syntag­
matic responses over all grades, tests and parts of speech. Second, all
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grades and not only second graders and college students produced more 
syntagmatic responses in the imagery test than in the first word test.
Third, while high imagery words elicited more syntagmatic responses than 
low imagery words in all tests, this was especially true in the imagery 
test.
This indicates that imagery value has its greatest influence on 
word association responding in situations which emphasize its use.
Together, these findings provide substantial indirect support for the 
hypothesis that syntagmatic responses are mediated by stimulus-evoked 
imagery. However, the strength of these findings is somewhat mitigated 
by two findings: First, while young children responded with more
syntagmatic association to high imagery words than to low, the difference 
was not as great for them as for the older groups. Second, though high 
imagery words elicited more syntagmatic responses than low imagery words 
on the first word test alone the difference was not statistically 
significant. The first finding may be explained in either of two ways:
1) Young children may not differentially process high and low
imagery words as do older children and adults; adult ratings of imagery
values of the words may not correspond to the ease with which the same
words evoke images in young children. High and low imagery words may induce 
either images (or syntactic factors) with the same facility in the young child,
thereby eliciting syntagmatic responses to the same extent. This argument is
mitigated by the fact that low imagery words elicited more miscellaneous
responses than high imagery words for all tests and grades, including
kindergartners.
2) Alternatively, adults' ratings of imagery values may hold true 
for children, but the mediation of word associations may occur differently 
for the two groups, so that imagery value may not play as great a role 
for younger as for older children. There is some evidence for this.
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Negation and clang responses of very young children occur without con­
sideration of the stimulus word's meaning. This in turn may have 
influenced the imagery effect in younger children by creating a basement 
effect: Since relatively few syntagmatic responses were made in the first
word test alone by young children, there was less opportunity for high 
and low imagery words to differentially elicit syntagmatic responses.
This appears to be a reasonable explanation of the fact that young 
children did not differentially respond to high and low imagery words to 
the same extent that older groups did.
The second finding may be explained by the fact that while the difference 
between high and low imagery words in the first word test was in the 
right direction, it would have to be greater than that for all tests 
combined, in order to obtain statistical significance. This is because 
differences between means in smaller data samples must be greater than 
that in larger samples in order to obtain statistical significance.
That significance was not reached may be more a function of statistical 
testing conventions than indicative of real differences between the means 
in question.
Imagery and Logical Paradigmatic Responding
It was predicted that low imagery words would elicit more para­
digmatic responses than high imagery words. This prediction was not con­
firmed. While low imagery words elicited blanks (no response at all) 
and other miscellaneous responses more often than high imagery words, 
high and low imagery words did not differentially elicit logical para­
digmatic responses for any of the tests, whether or not negation 
responses were categorized as paradigmatic. Apparently the lack of a
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readily available image does not foster the use of hierarchic semantic 
organization to mediate word association responding. Hence logical 
associations are not the only alternative response type in cases where 
imagery is not readily available for response mediation. Logical 
semantic structure is only one type of semantic organization available 
for mediation of word association. This is reasonable especially since 
logical and semantic structure generally have not been equated (e.g., 
Clark, 1972; Nelson, 1977).
Response Latencies
The prediction that imagery mediated association!(i.e., syntag­
matic associations in the first word and imagery test) would have longer 
latencies than linguistically mediated associations (i.e., logical 
paradigmatic associations in all tests and syntagmatic associations in 
the syntagmatic test) received only partial support. All syntagmatic 
associations, including linguistically mediated ones in the syntagmatic 
test, as well as imagery mediated ones in the first word and imagery 
tests, had longer latencies than the linguistically-mediated logical 
paradigmatic ones. Further, all first word responses, including syntag­
matic ones, (presumed to be imagery-mediated) were produced more quickly 
than all other responses, including syntagmatic ones in the imagery 
test (also presumed to be imagery-mediated). Thus, all responses 
respectively presumed to be linguistically and imagery mediated, were 
not generated with the same speed, and linguistically mediated responses 
were not consistently slower than imagery mediated responses.
These findings can be interpreted in two ways: 1) by refuting
the assumption concerning the mediators of the associations (i.e., that
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the syntagmatic associations in the first word and imagery tests on the 
one hand, and syntagmatic associations in the syntagmatic test and logical 
paradigmatic ones in all tests on the other, are really respectively 
mediated by imagery and linguistic factors) or 2) by accepting these 
assumptions at face value and refuting the hypotheses concerning the time 
it takes for these mediators to function under certain conditions. Since 
there is substantial evidence supporting the contention that high imagery 
and syntagmatic associations are correlated, there is no foundation for 
questioning this assumption. There is also no reason to question the 
assumption that logical responses, which reflect hierarchic semantic 
relationships among words, are mediated by that linguistic factor.
Further, syntagmatic associations in the syntagmatic test also seem to 
be produced by the linguistic factor, sentence-production-principles. 
Second graders were often observed to make up an entire sentence 
incorporating the stimulus word before they gave the response word which 
preceded or followed the stimulus in the sentence. College students were 
more proficient, and provided responses which together with the stimulus 
formed a common phrase (e.g. car-coat). Kindergarteners were least able 
to follow this test instruction, changing their pattern of responding 
least of all. But for the two older groups, at least sentence-production 
principles do seem to be at work.
Thus, the second interpretation seems more reasonable. Hence, 
the linguistic factor of sentence production mediates word associations 
more slowly than that of hierarchic semantic organization. This is 
consistent with Moran Mefferd and Kimble (1964) who found that contrast 
responses, a type of logical response, were faster than various types of
syntagmatic responses. Thus, while both semantic organization and
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sentence production principles may be linguistic factors, they are not 
invoked with the same temporal efficiency.
Further, syntagmatic responses in the first word test occurred 
much more quickly than those in the imagery test, though both appear to 
be mediated by imagery. But all responses in the first word test occurred 
more quickly than in any other test. Introducing any of the special 
instructions into the word association process slowed the process down. 
Hence, the disparity in these response latencies is not sufficient 
grounds to disclaim the assumption that first word and imagery syntag­
matic association of all subjects are in fact imagery mediated. It is 
simply that asking Ss to deliberately produce images in response to 
verbal stimuli slows down the process of responding.
Related to this is the developmental finding that college students 
responded more quickly than both second graders and kindergarteners in 
the first word test. But in the paradigmatic, imagery and especially 
syntagmatic tests, second graders were much more slow to respond than 
either kindergarteners or college students, who responded equally 
quickly. These results may be considered in the light of the fact that 
kindergarteners were least likely to change their level of responding 
over the various tests, while college students and second graders changed 
to about the same extent. Yet second graders responded more slowly and 
kindergarteners responded just as quickly as college students. This may 
indicate that college students were so adept at the word games they were 
asked to play in this experiment that they were not slowed down by 
special instructions. Kindergarteners were not slowed down either, but 
neither did they comply with the instructions. Second graders complied
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to about the same extent as college students, but they did so only by 
considerably slowing down their rate of response. It appears then that 
they can change their word association response pattern to accord with 
task demands only through much deliberate effort, as manifested by slower 
response times.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
As has already been discussed, the shift with age to paradigmatic 
responding occurred only when negation associations were not categorized 
as paradigmatic. Although negation responses were generated on the 
basis of an essentially paradigmatic principle, they can justifiably be 
discarded as paradigmatic since many children produced them automatically, 
without consideration of the meaning of the stimulus word, and thereby 
generated many responses that are not accepted words in English. When 
these responses were discarded, it appeared that (a) explicit knowledge 
of word-word relationships, and (b) metalinguistic knowledge as well as 
(c) a filled-in hierarchic semantic organization determined the greater 
spontaneous production of paradigmatic responses. Hence, spontaneous 
production of paradigmatic responses (other than negation responses) in 
a word association task requires self-conscious awareness of both what 
words are and what the semantic relationships among words are, as well 
as filled-in tacit knowledge of hierarchic semantic organization (which 
presumably mediates the production of such responses). Further, children 
and adults who have this knowledge and produce these paradigmatic 
responses, do so without self-conscious awareness.
Production of negation responses required none of the cognitive 
abilities that other paradigmatic responses did. Yet these responses were
110
deliberately produced. In other words, children who produced negation 
responses performed in a manner which seemed to require conscious 
recognition of the nature of the cognitive items involved and yet did 
not have what would appear to be the cognitive prerequisites of that 
recognition. Apparently all that is required to produce negation responses 
is knowledge of a 11 negation" rule; process the phonological content 
of the stimulus word and apply the prefix "not" or "un" to it for a 
response. This rule is learned in the classroom and can be used to 
generate the negated associations in a deliberate manner, with limited meta­
linguistic skill since only word sound, and not word meaning is 
considered.
These results support two basic assumptions of this study. First, 
that in order to respond paradigmatically, the subject must gain aware­
ness of those responses through education, as manifested by explicit 
articulation of hierarchic relationships. This was shown by the finding 
that a higher level of paradigmatic responding in the first word test 
required higher levels of explicit knowledge of hierarchic semantic 
relationships among words. Second, that the word association test has 
subtle task demands which the subject must grasp in order to respond 
appropriately, i.e. paradigmatically. This was shown by the fact that 
metalinguistic knowledge also determined paradigmatic responding in the 
first word test. This suggests that explicit category knowledge alone 
is insufficient for its implementation in the word association task.
Rather, it appears that hierarchic semantic organization must be accessed 
by a somewhat higher level cognitive mechanism tha n imagery or sentence 
production or negation principles in order to mediate word association, 
since its spontaneous use seems to depend on the understanding that words
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are arbitrary linguistic units. This implies that task demands, which 
call for the production of paradigmatic responses are understood.
The finding that the shift to higher levels of paradigmatic 
responding was accompanied by more completely filled-in hierarchic 
semantic organization was not predicted, however. But this is not at all 
surprising in light of the fact that hierarchic semantic organization 
becomes completely filled-in with age, a result which was not predicted 
by other investigations (e.g., Steinberg & Anderson, 1975; Mansfield, 
1977).
Neither metalinguistic knowledge, nor explicit knowledge of imagery 
was important in determining the change in paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
responding in the paradigmatic, syntagmatic and imagery tests. In fact, 
explicit knowledge of hierarchic semantic organization was the only 
cognitive variable that was more important than age in determining com­
pliance with test instructions, and that only in increasing paradigmatic 
responding in the paradigmatic test. Age and implicit hierarchic 
semantic organization were equally good predictors of such responding.
At first glance these results seem rather inconsistent with the finding 
that metalinguistic knowledge was more important than age in determining 
the developmental shift to paradigmatic responding in the first word 
test. But distinguishing between the two types of paradigmatic shifts 
under question from a somewhat different perspective may help to shed 
light on these seemingly incongruent results.
The amount of paradigmatic responding in the first word test is 
determined by the subject. It is not directly influenced by external 
directive. The amount of paradigmatic responding in the paradigmatic 
test, on the other hand, obviously is influenced by external directive;
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the test instructions. Metalinguistic knowledge may be related only to 
the first of these, in tasks in which the subject is required to spon­
taneously produce linguistic items. Indeed, Gerschitz & Glick (1975) 
found that metalinguistic knowledge was related to the child's propensity 
to spontaneously produce words (color labels) which were to be used as 
mnemonic devices to aid their performance on a color recognition task.
But it was related to the efficiency with which those words mediated 
recognition, even if they were produced upon experimenter's insistence. 
Similarly, metalinguistic knowledge appears to be related to the child's 
propensity to spontaneously produce paradigmatic responses via hierarchic 
semantic organization in the first word test. But it is not related to 
the extent to which hierarchic semantic organization successfully mediates 
associative responding when the subject is expressly directed to use it.
In other words, if a child is told to produce associations based on 
category relationships she does so, so long as she has a higher level of 
explicit knowledge of the semantic relationships underlying those 
responses. Metalinguistic knowledge, important to the spontaneous pro­
duction of paradigmatic responses, becomes irrelevant in this situation 
since its role is superseded by the external instructions.
None of the cognitive abilities assessed in this study were related 
to change in syntagmatic responding in the syntagmatic and imagery tests. 
This is probably because other skills which are more closely 
related to the specific task demands of each test are better predictors 
of performance on them. For example, the ability to understand exactly 
what a sentence and its parts are is probably important in determining 
performance on the syntagmatic test. Similarly, some factor other than
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explicit knowledge of imagery must be more closely related to the ability 
to control cognitive processes so as to generate images in response to 
verbal stimuli.
These results suggest many further avenues of research, particu­
larly one investigating the role of cognitive variables in language 
behaviors. The conjectures concerning metalinguistic knowledge can be 
studied more directly by comparing its influence on tasks analyzed in 
advance to differ in terms of the spontaneous vs. externally directed use 
of linguistic symbolic mediators. This may have ramifications for a 
developmental information processing model of cognition in which changes 
in executive functioning can be traced through changes in awareness of 
various cognitive processes and items.
In sum, there appears to be a developmental progression in the way 
children approach the word association task. First, very young children 
seem to produce responses based only on the phonological form of the word;
i.e., they produce clang responses, which rhyme with the stimulus, or 
negated responses, generated through an 11 negation " rule which consisting 
of prefixing "not" or "un" to the phonological form of the stimulus word 
to produce a response. Later, children begin to consider the meaning of 
the stimulus word. At the start, this may be confined to considering 
the imagery which the stimulus word evokes. Evidence indicates that 
stimulus imagery mediates the generation of syntagmatic associations. 
Gradually, as tacitly known hierarchic semantic organization becomes more 
filled-in, and the child gains explicit access to it, it is possible for 
her to produce paradigmatic responses. But in order to do so spontane­
ously, she must also understand that words are arbitrary, manipulable 
units. On the other hand, if she is explicitly directed to produce
114
paradigmatic responses, she will be able to do so, as long as she has 
explicit access to a filled-in hierarchic semantic structure. Metalin­
guistic knowledge does not play a role in this case since the explicit 
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Appendix A 










_ 4 Rinsland  ̂
Frequency
1. apple 6.73 7.00 7.67 la3
2. baby 6.70 6.90 7.04 lal
3. bird 6.67 6.96 7.88 la3
4. book 6.43 6.96 7.68 la 2
5. car 6.87 7.00 6.38 la2
6. dress 6.53 6.93 5.68 la2
7. picture 6.20 6.75 7.16 la3
8. table 6.50 7.00 7.60 la3
X 6.57 7.06 7.13
Verbs:̂
9. to eat 4.91 no ratings no ratings la2
10.to fly 6.4* I I I I la4
11.to jump 4.66 I I I I la 4
12.to laugh 6.4* I I I t lb 4
13.to sit 4.56 I I I I la4
14.to skate 5.9* I I lb4





I I I I lbl
Adjectives
17. beautiful 5.38 I I I I lb 5
18. cold 4.78 I I I I la2
19. dark 5.63 11 II lb3
20. red 6.00 I I I t lal
21. sick 5.10 I t I I la4
22. soft 4.81 I I 11 2a









25. chance 2.50 1.51 5.61 2a
26. idea 2.20 1.42 4.88 lb 5
27. life 4.07 2.96 6.78 2b
28. month 4.37 3.20 4.58 lb 5
29. secret** 2.86 6.90 2a
30. time 4.13 2.47 7.00 lal
31. truth 2.73 1.69 4.78 2a
32. year 3.4* no ratings no ratings la5




33. to ask 4.6* no ratings no ratings lbl
34. to begin 3.9* II I t 2a
35. to find 2.81 I t I I la3
36. to happen 4.4* no ratings no ratings 1
37. to have 1.61 n I I lal
38. to hope 3.83*** 1.18 5.52 la5
39. to promise 2.72 no ratings no ratings 2b




i t f t lbl
Adjectives:^
4J. good 3.13 no ratings no ratings lal
42. great 3.69 i t I I lbl
43. nice 2.78 i t I I la2
44. proud 4.31 i t I I 2b
45. rich 4.53 n II 2b
46. safe 3.7* i f f t 3a
47. small 3.88 i t I I 2a
48. wonderful 3.81 i t I I 3b
X
* rating obtained through author's own sample
** rating obtained from Spreen & Shulz (1966)
*** ratings based on those for 'hope'.
1. Norms for high and low imagery nouns obtained from Paivio, Yuille, & 
Madigan (1968), with indicated exceptions.
2. Norms for high and low imagery verbs and adjectives obtained from Paivio 
A. Unpublished norms, U. of Western Ontario, London, Canada.
3. These values are based on the mean ratings of an adult sample who scored
each item on a scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high) on the extent to which
the item a) evoked an image and b) referred to a sensed experience.
4. Meaningfulness scores were based on mean number of adults' free 
associations to each item within a 30 second period.
5. The Rinsland frequencies of vocabulary words of first-eight grade 
children are based on 4630 pages of conversation and 100,212 written
compositions. All words used in this list, with the exception of "to
happen" are of very high frequency in the vocabulary of first graders, 




Stimuli for Test of Hierarchic Semantic Organization












Vehicles car* bus airplane something 
that goes on 
the road.
something that 
takes you some' 
place.
Food apple* banana hot dog fruit food
Clothes dress skirt pants something that 
only girls can 
wear
clothes




barn a building 
you live in
buildings






*These items were used by Steinberg & Anderson. 1975.
Appendix C 













to run to 
jump
red-green
to laugh- 
to cry
rich-poor
Synonym
baby-infant
to begln-to start
beautiful-pretty
